Translation

Yuibutsuron no kantetsu no tameni
[To formulate a clear definition of Materialism]
Kato, Tadashi (1989)
in: Kato Tadashi, Chosakushu [Collected Works of Tadashi Kato], Vol. 1,
Nagoya: Unite (first appeared in Yuibutsuron Kenkyu
[Studies in Materialism], No. 55 [1936] and 56 [1937])
加藤正“唯物論の貫徹のために”『加藤正著作集 第1巻』1989年, 291－332頁. ユニテ社

Hideki Shibata

1. Where did the issues originate?
2. The secret of the duality of consciousness
3. Significance of thought
4. Status of the thought

I would like to respond to the criticisms of Mr. Kawanishi, Mr. Ishihara, and Mr. Mori\(^1\) regarding my previous articles\(^2\) so that I may clarify the points of controversy and contribute to our theoretical development. I will refrain from presenting the details of the individual issues here.

1. Where did the issues originate?

My previous articles overviewed various points at issue. However, the critics take up only one point among them. Therefore, I must answer from this point.

Mr. Mori formulates the point at issue as follows. As for the consciousness, "the human being as the actual social being has it," and thus, it has a duality. That is, the consciousness is a copy of objective existence, but at the same time, "if it belongs to a human being, it has a necessary ideological bias." A study of the consciousness must be carried out from two viewpoints. However, the critics accuse me of

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1) Yuibutsuron Kenkyu [Studies in Materialism], Nos. 53 and 54.
2) Kato, Tadashi “Feuerbach ni tsuite Dai Ichizan no Ichibei” [An Interpretation of the First Thesis on Feuerbach], in Yuibutsuron Kenkyu [Studies in Materialism], Nos. 42 and 43; Kato, Tadashi “Shukansei no Mondai” [What is subjectivity in materialism?], in Yuibutsuron Kenkyu [Studies in Materialism], No. 49.
addressing only the former dimension of the consciousness and dismissing the latter.

I understand their point well. This is the prejudice that they have carried since the time when I first posed the issue early in 1933. On the contrary, I have been interested in the epistemological constraints that are expressed in their prejudice and restrict their judgment regarding my articles.

Mr. Kawanishi distinguishes my standpoint through other words, which mean almost the same as those used by Mr. Mori at the end of his article. He coincides with Mr. Mori, who says that I ignore the ideological bias of the consciousness, and he assumes that I stand in the position of pure thought, that is, the position that transcends real life and is separated from the realistic interest and that I only discuss human practices intuitively. However, he argues that the authentic consciousness, i.e. practicing materialism, turns nature, human practices, and thought into objects of theoretical analysis for the practical interests of the advanced human class.

As for my position, when did I deny this standpoint? Where did I discuss issues from an otherwise different standpoint? I discussed my particular standpoint in my article, which should be clear to anyone who takes the time to read it.3)

However, I have no doubt that they misunderstand my epistemological standpoint as long as they continue to evaluate my argument from their standpoint. Therefore, it does not surprise me that Mr. Nagata4) and Mr. Ishihara have missed the primary purpose of my articles and found only the slightly outmoded arguments regarding the social-historical constraints on recognition. I only wonder why they do not criticize their own standpoint and sublate their constraining ideality and intuitiveness in order to support the materialistic standpoint in both name and reality.

Indeed, Mr. Kawanishi referred to the self-criticism of our philosophical research in Japan.5) However, in all of his articles, he simply makes biased remarks against my articles founded on his old-fashioned prejudices. Has he clearly articulated a "mediator," which enables him to modify his epistemological standpoint and approximate it more to the practice by accusing and dismissing me? If he improved his standpoint by criticizing me, where is the self-criticism of our philosophical research in Japan? Does he truly understand self-criticism and not only in an empty oratory way? True self-criticism is the way to connect with the practice, that is, we review ourselves in light of the practices and make ourselves adaptable to the development of those practices. Will he overcome the trend to break away from his standpoint on practices by contrasting his epistemological standpoint, which he believes is that of the advanced human class, with other epistemological standpoints?

Regarding any epistemological positions that would lead theories to mysticism, we must oppose them with the human social practice and an understanding of this practice. If we consider various other cognitive theories in light of the real practice and a scientific understanding of the practice, we

3) Cf. Yuibutsuron Kenkyu [Studies in Materialism], Nos. 43 and 49; Eighth Thesis on Feuerbach.
4) Chuo Koron [Opinion Leader], Vol. 52, No. 2.
5) Yuibutsuron Kenkyu [Studies in Materialism], No. 53, p. 105.
should be able to grasp our own epistemological standpoint as well. We can overcome the dissociation of our standpoint from the practice only when we criticize ourselves through increasingly grasping the practice of the advanced class and the significance and conditions of the practice and through increasingly adjusting our objective standpoint to the objective status of the practice. We should always seek a mediator or the momentum to pursue this goal and adjust our epistemological standpoint fully to practice a subjective activity. On the other hand, we can reasonably promote the sciences as a summary of practical experience and of the practice itself, which makes it possible to constructively criticize other epistemological standpoints. This is my epistemological position.

Has Mr. Kawanishi criticized his epistemological position in this way? I wonder if he criticized me on the basis of his self-criticism. Mr. Ishihara has also written an article entitled "The immediate new task of the materialistic epistemology," but he did not clearly mention anything regarding this task anywhere in his article. The task, i.e. the adjustment of our epistemological standpoint into practice, must always be realized through self-criticism. Otherwise, it will end up as a superficial task or disengagement from the practice, and it will result in a mere assertion of one's own epistemological standpoint. In that case, there is only a factional conflict between one epistemology and another. Such a conflict would only make one narrow-minded and disengage one from the real task. True mutual criticism, whereby self-criticism is performed, enables one to adjust one's epistemological standpoint to real practice and to compromise with a different standpoint.

Frankly speaking, I did not find any useful comments in the criticisms of my standpoint. Their comments were self-evident to me. What I found to be important was grasping essentially, practically, realistically, and materialistically what they understood intuitively and superficially. They take pride in the fact that they have sublated the standpoint of Mr. Miki, Mr. Fukumoto, and "the theory of ideology," as well as that of Mr. Bukharin and Mr. Deborin. I only wish that they would sublate the least residuum of the intuitiveness and the ideality and effectively complete their task. If my small effort is understood correctly, I am convinced that their standpoint would be improved. If they understand the point of my article and proceed with a mutual criticism of the article, then I will also learn from them. With these expectations, I will tackle this dispute with enthusiasm and commitment.

Mr. Mori states "now that the differences in the views of Mr. Kato and those of Mr. Kawanishi and Mr. Ishihara are clear," is it now "required that both views should be valued according to how to accomplish their materialistic viewpoints in a realistic process?" As an aside, I pose my epistemological view based on the reflection of my epistemological standpoint, which I myself utilize in the theoretical treatment of scientific and practical problems. Thus, my critics would be the same. In my article, I explained my standpoint in relation to very extensive issues, and I understand the way my critics process concrete problems. If the mutual discrepancies of our epistemological standpoints are

6) Yuibutsuron Kenkyu [Studies in Materialism], No. 53, p. 123.
7) Yuibutsuron Kenkyu [Studies in Materialism], No. 54, p. 138.