clear and my allegation is one-sided, the developments of my critics must be used in my own self-criticism.

If, as I see it, their standpoint is firmly rooted in idealistic intuitive confinement, although they call my standpoint one-sided, and if their allegation proves that their standpoint is dualistic, eclectic, and philosophically non-partisan, then my developments must be used in their own self-criticism. They cannot yet find the true discrepancy between my standpoint and theirs. If they are people who can reconsider their standpoint through a step-by-step deployment of a theory in the treatment of concrete problems, i.e. if they are not philosophers, then I will quit this discussion here. If they are philosophers, it is their duty to review mutually our epistemologies based on the conditions given. If the conflicting points of the epistemological standpoints do not become clear, opposing parties will always exist and this opposition will continue forever in all regions. I will present my views regarding scientific, cultural, and social problems as often as possible, and if it does not contribute to reducing the opposition of the parties, then there is nothing more I can do. I think that I can already see this in the evaluations of Mr. Kawanishi and Mr. Ishihara regarding the issues presented in my articles.Clarification regarding the discrepancies of the epistemological standpoints is very important because concrete development is necessary. If we all take the epistemological standpoint of criticizing ourselves on the basis of practical and actual development, instead of mutual distortion and exclusion on the basis of faction-torn views, mutual distortion and exclusion will be sublated in the grasping of practical reality, and we can be materialistically consistent in the adaptation of the epistemological standpoint. From this viewpoint, I will criticize the confusion (the eclectic and non-partisan style) surrounding their epistemological standpoint.

2. The secret of the duality of consciousness

The valuation of both Mr. Mori and Mr. Kawanishi regarding my work formulates their standpoint. This standpoint always considers the problem of the consciousness or the awareness from two sides, but they cannot be sublated. Mr. Kawanishi spoke of two fundamental propositions of the epistemology: "recognition is nature's reflection" and "theory is prescribed by the practice." He does not know that these two propositions are impossible to unify if the problem is formulated in this way. Mr. Mori stated, after he explained the duality noted above, that "in this case, the consciousness is the copy of the object, and it is basic in the materialism."8 If so, based on this basic proposition, he must also explain the other proposition. It should be the standpoint of basic materialism, should it not?

The proposition that the consciousness has an ideological attribute, that it is an appendage of the human being, is another expression of the fact that the consciousness copies and reflects not only the object (the nature) of a human being, but also the human being itself. The duality of the conscious-

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8) Yuibutsuron Kenkyu [Studies in Materialism], No. 54, p. 137.
ness or the two fundamental propositions of this recognition mean that in the light of reality, the arbitrary division of the fundamental proposition of materialism is that "consciousness is the reflection of the being" or "consciousness copies and reflects the object outside of it, the object for the consciousness (nature and human being)." However, why is such an arbitrary division necessary? Do they want, from a dark reactionary intention, to prevent the complete penetration of this fundamental proposition and to try to consecrate a region that materialism does not reach? No, and I do not like to use such demagogic expressions. The opposite is true. They accepted materialism in the recognition of nature, but they still keep idealism in the recognition of human history (the recognition of the human being). It is the expression of the defect in the transition period. I will return to this issue below.

According to Mr. Mori, the aspect that is not "the basis" of the consciousness, the aspect of ideological attributes and the aspect of the prescriptiveness of the recognition by the human practice, are actually more materialistically basic, and they enable other aspects of the consciousness. In other words, recognition and consciousness are determined by the human being as an historic social being and the latter is also determined by nature as the product of nature. Because there is such a determinacy, the movement of the consciousness does not contradict the movement of nature and the human being's practice; it agrees with it, reflects it, and copies it. That the consciousness is determined by its existence means nothing but the fact that the consciousness reflects its existence. All the events in the world interact with, constrain, and are related to each other. In that sense, they reflect and copy each other. "It is illogical to assert that all matter is conscious (but it is logical to assert that all matter possesses a property which is essentially akin to sensation, the property of reflection)" If you read Section 2 of Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, you will easily understand that materialists are those who assert the primacy of nature over the mind, the being over thinking, the body over the psyche. "Another aspect," i.e. the possibility of the knowledge of the world, can also be easily explained from this.

The consciousness is the product of the human being and belongs to the human being. Therefore, when existence interacts with the human being (when it comes into practice), it interacts inevitably with consciousness and the latter copies and reflects the former through mutual constraints (It is natural for the being to copy a consciousness, to reflect a consciousness in the case of an interaction, or for the consciousness to work on the being and to change it. However, the consciousness is the product of human activity. It is the brain activity in the human body. Therefore, interaction with the objective world requires physical activity or practice, because the consciousness itself cannot directly interact with the world outside of the practice. This point becomes important below.).

Not all forms of consciousness are conscious of materialism. Not all forms of consciousness know


that it is an offshoot of some fundamental being, is determined by the latter, and reflects the latter. However, as far as it is conscious of this in a reflective manner, it is a materialistic consciousness. For consciousness that is conscious of this materialism, to copy the fundamental being existing outside of itself is a natural attitude. This is the materialistic standpoint that Engels formulated at the beginning of the Section 4 of Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy and that is illustrated with concrete examples in the same section.

If the consciousness reflects and copies existence, which means that the consciousness moves through the interaction with the objective being (the nature and the human being), the mutual constraints, and ultimately the determination of its existence and dependence upon it, then why is it necessary to distinguish two phases of the consciousness, that is, consciousness reflecting objects and consciousness determined by a human being and its practice? I would like to examine these questions more closely.

Consciousness is determined by a human being who has a consciousness and the objects of the human being. How the consciousness copies and reflects these objects is complicated and varied. I analyzed the various forms of reflection and the interrelations among them in my article.\textsuperscript{11}\footnote{Kato, Tadashi “Shukansei no Mondai” [What is subjectivity in materialism?], in Yuibutsuron Kenkyu [Studies in Materialism], No. 49.} Some of these forms are intuition, representation, and thought; will, sentiment, and cognition; science and fine art; and philosophy and religion. They not only reflect objective and subjective existence, their mutual inversions and transformations are also determined by the movements of existence as they reflect and copy the existence.\textsuperscript{12}\footnote{Mr. Ishihara cited arbitrarily from my article, interpreted one-sidedly, and made me an opponent to the theory of reflection (Yuibutsuron Kenkyu [Studies in Materialism], No. 53, p. 124).} Thought is one of these forms. Consciousness that is aware that it is the reflection of existence—different from intuition and representation—traces existence that is outside of itself and reflects it in itself. Concept is the developmental form of reflection and is the result of the development. Being conscious of existence outside of the consciousness as a concept is cognition. The sum of all cognition (knowledge) is realistic science. The movement of the consciousness determined by existence in conceptual reflection (verification, factual evidence),\textsuperscript{13}\footnote{Details will be provided below.} and the object of the logic and the dialectic, which are the sciences of the law of thought. If a concept is not considered a reflection of existence but is more or less independently existing and developing, it is an idealistic concept. In this case, there is idealistic science (formerly known as philosophy, e.g., the philosophy of history, natural philosophy, etc.) and idealistic logic or epistemology as the philosophy of pure reason (formal logic, transcendental logic, logic of absolute ideas, or idealistic dialectic). However, if a concept is developed as the result of the determination by existence instead of being considered existing independently, it is a materialistic concept. In this case, there is materialistic science (empirical sciences of nature and society) and materialistic epistemology (materialistic dialectic and logic of materialism). Material-
ism is consciousness that is determined by existence outside of itself in a way that agrees with the connections to and moments of existence, that is, cognition that traces the existence according to its connections and moments. The form in which materialism expands while it is determined by existence is to "think" about the true meaning of existence and to unravel the truth of existence "in natural scientific faithfulness."

I will now return to the duality of consciousness, my critics' fundamental proposition regarding cognition. Mr. Mori says that the consciousness reflects the object—consciously, more or less as it is—and this is the "basic materialistic understanding" of consciousness. His statement is now clear. What else can be the standpoint of materialism? Their epistemology fails due to their inability to comprehensively analyze the determinacy of consciousness by human practice and the ideological nature of the human being, their failure to understand the significance and conditions of supporting the standpoint of materialism, and the development of materialistic consciousness and conceptual cognition through this determinacy. The movement of consciousness occurs in the human being that has consciousness. It is a prerequisite for consciousness to develop into the form of materialistic cognition and to develop as materialistic cognition. Because the only form of development for such materialistic cognition is for the consciousness to trace empirically, observationally, and experimentally the objects that are outside of the consciousness, the completely determined consciousness is one that has sublated and internalized all forms determined by human practical movements and recognizes human beings as such.

The cognition of the proletariat should not be the consciousness won by proletarians but the cognition of the proletariat itself. When I posed this thesis in 1933, their old friends criticized me for denying the fact that theories can only develop through determination by practices. By this criticism, these friends revealed that they did not clearly know what theoretical (conceptual) cognition and thought were. Even now, four years later, they cannot understand the standpoint of materialism, conceptual cognition, and the way of thinking about objective existence as such, and they think that this standpoint is detached from the human practice. They also say that I argue the standpoint of materialism but ignore that it is the consciousness of the human being as a social being. Consciousness is determined by the development of the interaction between the human being and the objects in the outside world or the practical objective action of the human being, and can be the conceptual thought or materialistic cognition only as it adapts itself to the form of objective development. At the same time, consciousness can adapt itself to all practical activities and their development only in the form of conceptual thought. The author of *The Poverty of Philosophy* explains his position as "to take note of what is happening before their eyes and become its mouthpiece" and the "science, which

14) "The retrospective and prospective views on our dialectical materialism" (*Yuibutsuron Kenkyu* [Studies in Materialism], No. 6).

15) This thought is usually called "theoretical thought" or "pure thought" according to Engels' usage, but I simply call it "thought" in this article.