is produced by the historical movement and associating itself consciously with it.\(^{16}\) If my critics share the same standpoint with this author, from the thesis that theory and cognition are determined by the interest of the practice and the practices of the human being, they could have elicited the conclusion that only materialistic cognition, which objectively explains the causes of the interest of the practice and the practice of the human being, can consciously reflect and combine the meaning and the interest of the practice, in the most complete way. Consciousness such as class interest affection, the favor, antagonism affection, and the requisite satisfying motivation constitute the consciousness that was determined by the significance and the condition of the objective movement of the class and reflects them in the consciousness. As this determining relationship becomes full activity and is verified by the objective movement, adaptation becomes straightforward and the consciousness comes to know that it is the reflection of the movement. Then, the interest consciousness and the favor are sublated into the cognition of the objective movement and are transformed. All consciousness is determined objectively and is led by this objective movement. We must grasp this movement objectively, causatively, logically, and in its conceptual form and understand this movement in order to recognize this fact.\(^{17}\) My critics, on the other hand, maintain that realizing the fact that consciousness is determined by practice puts thought and materialistic cognition in the categories of the ideological side of consciousness (Mr. Mori), the favor of the class (Mr. Ishihara), and the natural instinct and interest presentation (Mr. Kawanishi). The fundamental failure of my critics is that if consciousness is determined by practice, they misunderstand the ranking of the various forms of consciousness. Therefore, they did not understand a word of my article regarding subjectivity.

The reason why they assume the proposition as abstract is that cognition is the reflection of the object, and they find it necessary to complement one proposition with another (that cognition is determined by practice). Through the understanding of practice or subjective human activity, objective understanding, and conceptual cognition, the consciousness relates more to the practice that determines the consciousness. This is materialism. My critics do not know that the concept is the adaptation of the consciousness to practice and is the intermediary moment for the consciousness to approach and adapt to this practice. They interpret the proposition that the thought is the supreme form of the consciousness as if thoughts are absolutely separate from practice, and they think that it requires intuitive representations, feelings, wishes, instincts, and so on to reproduce the practical connection. As for them, the interrelationship of the processes inside the consciousness is not understood.


\(^{17}\) Mr. Kawanishi and Mr. Ishihara misunderstand that the standpoint is never determined by the practice but transcends the practice and sees it intuitively. They would never have held such a standpoint, although Lenin views it to be “the highest task of humanity” (Cf. Lenin, V. I. (1962) *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy*, in Lenin, V. I. (1962) *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 325).
according to the premises of materialism (that the consciousness is determined by human practices and the outside world). As a result, they must keep idealism and the consciousness relatively separate from the practice to complement materialism. This is what they call dualism of the consciousness and the two fundamental problems of cognition. However, such problems do not exist for materialists. There is no such dualism or fundamental problems. There is no such divide. There is only one and the same thing, which they want to divide and then create an interrelationship between. When they discuss reflection, their idea of consciousness is considered to be separate and apart from the practice, and when they discuss determination by the practice, their idea of consciousness is not from the standpoint of materialism. What would happen if these two sides were joined? Materialism would be idealistically limited or there would be confusion resulting from a partially developed theory of combining idealism and materialism. The following may result from joining both sides: a standpoint to remove the results of materialistic cognition from the verification relationship and the conformance relationship to realistic practice and to insert it into other non-materialistic forms of consciousness; the standpoint to understand materialism only from the side of instinct, trends, and the interest of the practical human being; and the standpoint to promote a new standpoint of epistemology or the epistemology of such a standpoint.

The standpoint of inserting various forms of consciousness such as feeling, intuition, and representation between the practicing human being and the materialistic cognition could result in addressing these forms as long as they are verified and qualified, although cognition should be verified by applying it to a cognitive object. According to this standpoint, to objectively recognize the practice itself is considered to be separate and apart from this practice. Thus, cognition determined by practice means that the cognition is not determined by the practice itself but by one of its dimensions that appears abstractly as a tendency or trend in some form of consciousness (demand, feeling, interest, etc.). If the practice is considered to be confined in such a way, then the real, concrete practice must always be alienated. Tendencies and trends can be induced from various dimensions of real, concrete practices and one suggested tendency can easily suggest an opposing tendency. Tendencies that originate from one and the same standpoint of practice oppose each other in the sectarian way. Such opposition can be sublated if it is revealed that these tendencies and trends originate from one and the same concrete, realistic practice and if they are adapted to the practice. The epistemological standpoint of my critics is not that of adaptation to a realistic practice. They confine human practice to the form limited by the reflection of ideology and contrast this limited human practice with natural, social existence and make the cognition subject recognize the world. Mr. Kawanishi rejects my criticism, which he says is a distortion. However, my critics do not understand the practice objectively, but only from the standpoint of ideologically distorted "practices," i.e. tendencies and trends. They may have to sublate the standpoint (intuition of tendencies) to the objective cognition of the practice.
3. Significance of thought

Thought, that is, the subject of the materialistic cognition, can interact with various events only in the form of the cognition of objects. When thought is determined by realistic events or psychological phenomena, thought moves in the form of "recognizing" (or reflecting) the phenomena.\(^{18}\), \(^{19}\)

The arguments for the standpoint of materialistic epistemology have been put forth. Now, the issue regarding materialistic epistemology is to clarify the law of the development of thought. For the following reasons, I distinguish the development of thought and the law of the development of thought. The very development of thought is the total sum of the knowledge that comes from the practices of the human being and the overall development of the empirical demonstrative cognition. However, the developments of the thoughts of individuals are mutually different and the developments of these thoughts appear in various ways depending on the school of thought, class, ethnicity, and the era. The forms of consciousness under which the equivalent scientific technical knowledge is obtained are mutually different. The thoughts appear mutually different as realistic conditions to determine and reflect the thoughts that are different. However, they develop according to one and the same law as long as they are thoughts and conceptual cognitions.

The law of thought can never be reflected as an object of thought but instead, determines the thought. Determination and reflection were originally a relation between the processes outside and inside of the thought. The law of thought does not determine the thought from the outside, but it is the law of the thought itself, which rules and enables the thought to discern reality. If there is no inside law of thought that can be analyzed and distinguished from the law of the processes outside of thought, then the thought can be reduced to those outside processes and show no active meaning in the interaction with them.

\(^{18}\) Mr. Kawanishi thinks that the psychological process determines the cognitional process and inheres within it. If the psychological process determines the thinking process, merely a science, then only psychology is born. If the psychological process inheres in the thinking process, the latter emerges only in the concept of psychology. However, among the processes of consciousness, the thinking process is more conclusive than other psychological processes. To think of this relationship in the opposite manner contradicts the proposition that the consciousness is determined by existence. I would like to submit this problem to Mr. Kawanishi for future research (Cf. Section 2 of this article).

\(^{19}\) The thought as a subject for cognition also becomes an object for cognition. Mr. Ishihara denies this. However, the thinking processes of our predecessors and the contemporary persons and our own previous thinking processes are also reflected in the thinking cognitive subject as the cognition object as long as they determine the cognitive subject and inhere in it. Thus, the science to grasp the law of the thinking process, i.e., epistemology or philosophy, is born and philosophical or logical concepts are born. The cognition of the human being is, independently of Mr. Ishihara's consciousness, the objective process that develops on the basis of the historic activities of human beings.
The first step of the cognition of such an interaction is to analyze the law of each of the elemental processes. Because my critics did not recognize the need to analyze the internal law of the thought itself, they have not even reached the first step of the epistemology. My critics think that the logic surrounding the law of thought is the generalization of individual sciences and is therefore an abstraction from the real entity, but they do not know what the generalization and the abstraction mean. They mean studying sciences (generally relating to conceptual cognition) to discover the law of the thought, as we study the real entity to discover the law of the real entity. The law that dominates thought itself becomes the object of the thought for the first time in some stage of the development of the thought.\textsuperscript{20} The knowledge of the law of the thought has been increasingly deepened more from Aristotle to Hegel and the pioneers of present-day materialism.

My critics do not think that the law of the thought is an internal law of the thought itself and reduce it to "the generalized law of the real entity." I understand this because Mr. Ishihara denied the necessity to analyze objectively the law of the thought and criticized, in tune with Mr. Kawanishi, that I made the dialectic the study of the "external form of thought," although I defined the role of philosophy as a means of analyzing the internal law of thought. According to Mr. Kawanishi, the analysis of the law of the thought itself is a formalistic logicism. Although Engels states that materialism is nothing more than realistic cognition, i.e. the empirical scientific cognition of the realistic world, Mr. Kawanishi considers materialism a kind of philosophy, equates it with the dialectic, and criticizes me for deviating into the realm of positivism using Engels' school of thought. My critics do not fully understand that I attempt to consciously conduct my research on materialism, i.e. the empirical science of the real world (the development of the thought itself), through self-awareness of the law of the development of thought (logic dialectic, epistemology, and philosophy).

In this context, I would like to explain my words: "the object of philosophy is not the general law of the world as a whole, but the law of thought."\textsuperscript{21} Engels stated repeatedly that the philosophical object of materialism was the thought and its law. He also said that only the study of the law of thought (the logic and the dialectic) remains a philosophical problem among conventional philosophy and all the others become the problem of the empirical sciences. On the other hand, Engels often characterizes the dialectic "the science of the 'general' law of the development, the movement and the relations of the nature, the human society and the thought." An explanation for this has not proceeded since Mr. Nagata's article.\textsuperscript{22} The true answer to this issue is that the dialectic is the general law of the world, because this is the moment of the law of thought. The dialectic as the general law of movement is not an integral part of the actually existing entity. This law does not exist in the real world. It is not the soul of the real world. The logicists at the Deborin School, however, disagree. In short, it is not a law

\textsuperscript{20} Cf. footnote No. 19.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Yuibutsuron Kenkyu} [Studies in Materialism], No. 54, p. 153.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Yuibutsuron Kenkyu} [Studies in Materialism], No. 1.