according to which the real world develops. In this sense, it is not a law such as the law of energy transformation. It is the law according to which the thought attempts to recognize conceptually the special laws of development of the real phenomena. The general law refers to the law of thought. The dialectic logic as the general law stands up realistically only in the thought, and it can be studied empirically only as the concept of thought. On the other hand, the development of the law of the existing entity, the dialectic of the existing entity itself, can only be made clear from a direct analysis of existence. We perceive the dialectic as the intuition of the real world if we project the law of thought onto the real entity and consider it as the law of existence. However, intuition is intuition, and it is not thought or cognition about the existing entity. We can change the world according to cognition, but we can only interpret it according to intuition. In order to emphasize this, I explained Engels’ real intention using the paradoxical expression that seems to contradict his (and Lenin’s) formula.

In any case, Mr. Kawanishi’s incorrect theory that “the general law of the world works as the law of thought and category, when it is grasped” must be disregarded. The law of thought should be the law that dominates the thought regardless whether or not it is consciously grasped. Dialectical materialism is the standpoint of cognition that is conscious about the law of thought, dominates it, and studies the movement of the real entity. However, in case of Mr. Kawanishi, cognition is conscious about the general laws of the real world and those laws become the laws of thought. “The law of thought substantively belongs to the law of the real world and is a copy of the world.” However, the law of thought is the law of the very copying and is the law that is peculiar to thought itself. It is not simply the concept, the category, and the general law, but it is the internal law of their changes and developments. Before the law of thought was recognized as such, it was unavoidable that the law of thought would be recognized as intuition or the general determinant of the real entity. However, in essence, it is the law of the thought and its development in one phase. My critics have reduced the law of thought to the intuition of the world. It makes the science that recognizes the law of thought impossible. My critics fall into positivism because they think little of the law of thought with its own internal development law, and because they make a mess of the law of thought with their categories and the general laws. It most clearly appears in their views regarding the subjects of these categories and general laws. According to Engels, it is “real thought, and ... this thought ... has a long empirical history.” However, my critics ignore the thought subject that develops in its peculiar law, and they reduce the logical categories and general laws to the real world (logicism) and create the technique that manipulates them in the mutual relations of actual human beings (positivism).

This dualism of my critics can be easily overcome, because the cognitive subject is not the human being’s sensible activity, but the thought that develops in the human nervous system, and the catego-

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23) Yuibutsuron Kenkyu [Studies in Materialism], No. 54, p. 153.
24) Yuibutsuron Kenkyu [Studies in Materialism], No. 54, p. 153.
ries and general laws are a medium to reach the special laws of the entities and those produced by the thought itself (or the self-restriction of the thought).26, 27, 28

4. Status of the thought

The fundamental reason why the critics reduced thought dualistically is that they did not understand the interactions among the processes of the consciousness and the real entities, but intuitively saw the other processes as one process or reduced the former into the latter. I overcame the dualism of the critics by analyzing the true character of thought itself. Now, I would like to complete my analysis by analyzing the objects of the thought. By analyzing the thought, we now know the identity of what determines, constrains, and moves the thought and the object to be reflected and copied by the thought. Hereinafter, I will analyze this point positively.

The critics assume that “the cognition subject is the social human being”29 and insist on “the identity”30 or “the dialectic unity of the working human being (human activities) and the cognition subject.”31 However, both have specific development laws respectively in the background of the interaction. After all, the identity of both the cognitive subject, the essence of which is the thought process, and the sensitive human action, the essence of which is a productive activity, do not work. Also, do the critics know what “the dialectic unity” is? It is not the identity of the two concepts. It is that one of the two entities in the interaction includes, reflects, and sublates the other in itself and develops itself.

26) Mr. Deborin erroneously identified the general development law of the world with the special law of the thought. Engels prescribed the dialectic of the general law as the general law of nature, society, and thought, but he does not see it as inherent in the thought. The virgin territory of the epistemology of the future seems to be open here. In an article about the dialectic in the Great Encyclopaedia of the Soviet Union, categories of the fundamental law of the dialectic are separately explained and the epistemological processes are described independently. That the unity and that the internal relation of the categories are provided in the development of the law of the cognition process, and that recognizing the law would advance categories to a higher level have not yet been considered. However, without this, it is impossible to establish epistemology.

27) I would like to analyze the development of the law of the thought itself and the subject of the thought itself in my future research. A simple implication is presented before Note 9 in Section 4.

28) It is clear from the following point that the standpoint of my critics is reductionism (as well as intuitionism and mechanism). My critics do not grasp the thought itself that expands in the human being through interactions with the objective existence of the human being, and they do not attempt to clarify the meaning and the law of thought. They reduce various stipulations of thought to objective existence and to sensuous human activities. They intuitively grasp the stipulations of thought as the real law and the thinking process as the practical process of the human being.

29) *Yuibutsuron Kenkyu* [Studies in Materialism], No. 54, p. 151.

30) *Yuibutsuron Kenkyu* [Studies in Materialism], No. 53, p. 111.

31) *Yuibutsuron Kenkyu* [Studies in Materialism], No. 53, p. 109.
The thought has the law of itself while it expands from the feeling activities, is determined by them, and interacts with them. The unity of the thought of this interaction is the process of recognizing the reality. When this interaction is unified with a human activity, it is represented as the process of the conscious performance of a human activity or the activity that is conscious of the purpose. On that point, this is not a cognitive process, but is the process of practices that do not follow the law of thought but the law of practice (historical social law). My critics, however, put the thought (theory) and human activity (practice) on the same level and see the one in the other intuitively and the process of the one in the process of the other. 32, 33

32) Mr. Kawanishi and others assume that the characteristic of the practice of the proletariat is the model or the essential qualities of the proletarian cognition; they reduce the cognition process to the intuition of the practice of the proletariat; and they do not attempt to recognize the practice of the proletariat itself. I am often disappointed by this. The critics seem to think that noting the trend of the practice, which determines the thought and moves it, is discussing cognition. However, in that case, they only discuss the intuitive possibility of the development of the cognition. For the thought, the trend (the intuition of the practice), the practice itself, and the actual concrete development itself are merely a feasibility. Why will the critics not make clear the meaning and conditions (the internal condition of the thought or cognition itself) of developing the cognition itself realistically on the basis of possibility? Moreover, different from the other types of consciousness, the thought cannot develop without real objects, that is, without being based on reality. Mr. Kawanishi attempts to discover the factor that determines the thought without the object, the reality, and the sensuousness and discusses the interest of the advanced class and the more fundamental practices. However, unless appearing as reality, which is the foundation of thought, this does not realistically determine the thought. It is the upper architecture of the thought as ideology or intuition, and it is only the provisions of the consciousness that are produced by the intermediary of the thought. It is not a factor on which to form realistic cognition. Mr. Kawanishi is only talking about the prescriptions of the consciousness as if they were reality. Such reality does not influence the cognitive subject from the back of the subject who is facing the objects. My critics grasped the cognition (the theory) and human activity (the practice) in the intuitive identity, abstracted them from the actual interaction, discarded the reality on both sides, and reduced them to merely identical intuition prescriptions.

33) Mr. Kawanishi misunderstood me when I said “the human practice is independent of the thought (or the consciousness) of the human being and exists realistically and objectively outside it” and “the human practice stands out of the human being as the object according to Kato.” (Yuibutsuron Kenkyu [Studies in Materialism], No. 53, p. 107). This is evidence of the fact that my critics support the identity of the thought and the practice. Through the interaction of the theory (the thought) and the practice, practice is unified with the theory. The theory is determined by the practice and reflects the practice (and the nature that is reflected in the practical experience) and in that sense is outside of the practice. The development of the practice of the high order must be made clear by integrating itself into the practice regarding the theory and capturing the theory that exists outside the practice and inside the self. However, the critics misunderstood the detection of this interaction with the splitting of the theory and the practice. The critics are not interested in the theory that develops
My critics distinguished the thought between identity with practice and identity with the objective being, which caused their dualism as determined by the two areas. The reason for this dualism is that they were not able to understand how the real entities reflect the thought. All existence outside the practice (the sensuous activity) is not completely reflected in the consciousness exactly as it is. The existing thing can act on (be reflected in) the consciousness only through the practice, i.e. as far as it interacts with the human being, enters the area of the practical experience, and acts on the sensibilities of the human. The thing that acts upon the sensibilities is reflected in the brain through the nervous system from the sense organs and determines the thought. Then, it is reflected in all the psychological processes through the movement (the perception judgment) of the thought. It is accompanied by the reaction. The movement of the psychological process itself, conversely, is reflected in the movement of the thought (the decision and the inference). It is reflected in the brain and acts on the sensuous activity through the nervous system. The sensuous activity receives a reaction from existence itself by acting on it, and the interaction occurs in this way. If my critics represent the cognitive subject and the active human being in the intuitive identity, the result is the intuitive identity of the cognitive object and the existence that is outside of the human practice. However, instead, if they recognize that the practice is not intuitively identified with a cognitive subject or conscientious subject, but is an objective practice or is a realistic, sensuous activity independent of the consciousness, they will understand that it involves all that determines the cognition, moves it and reflects it, and should be understood. What is not reflected in the sensuous cognition is not acted on and reflected in the thought. "Being, indeed, is always an open question beyond the point where our sphere of observation ends."34) To "recognize the existence of an external world independent of the human mind is" not "to transcend the bounds of experience."35)

The First Thesis on Feuerbach makes the point as follows. The object, reality, and sensuousness that face the thought stand not outside of or in front of the subject, so to speak, but in it. When we think of the object, we do not intuitively grasp the thing outside of the activity of the subject, but in fact, the being that exists and is reflected in the subject (sensuous human activity and practice) or the sensuous image of the being determines—through the nervous system—the thought and makes the thought adaptable to itself, i.e. the sensuous activity makes the thought aware of itself. The being that is outside of the human sensuous activity does not yet interact with the sensuous human being, does not yet reflect the sensuous experience and become reality, and stands outside of the sensuous-

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