ness. It can exist but cannot determine the cognitive thought and become the object of the thought. The point of the thesis is not the identity of the cognitive subject (thought) and the practice (sensuous subject), but the identity of the practice and the cognitive object. The subject or the human activity has been identified idealistically with the thought process, but it stands factually outside of the thought and is the object and the sensuousness. It is isolated from the thought process and becomes an objective activity. The thought only grasps the realistic subject (the eighth thesis on Feuerbach). The subject in its true form is the human sensuous activity that mediates the nature to itself in order to make the nature a sensuous and realistic object, i.e. its own environment (outer world), and depends on this environment in order to change itself. This is the social human being or human society. The realistic content of the subject is the production process and the social conscious process, but the former subject is the conscious reflection or the abstract restriction of the real and sensuous subject.

The intuitive materialists and my critics forget that the human being and its environment represent the nature that is changed, sensuously restricted, and made sensuous and humane through human activity. They represent their environment as outside of human activity (practice), although it is mediated by human activity, and they intuitively identify this environment with nature itself. That is the reason why my critics condemn me when I say that practice confirms nature itself and the relationships in it. To me, this is a senseless and vicious criticism.  

To summarize, thought does not reflect objective existence, while on the other hand, it is determined by practice. Everything that should be reflected in the thought is included in the practice (the reality, the sensuousness, and the object) that determines the thought. The thought considers each moment that is included in the practice. That is, the thought abstracts (analyzes) from the practical, sensuous reality and creates a concept while sublating (synthesizing) those various stipulations to the interaction, achieving cognition of the objective whole. This is the law (the specific law of thought) according to which the thought recognizes the realistic practice while being determined by the realistic practice.  

36) Most of the discussions of Mr. Ishihara and Mr. Kawanishi are criticisms based on this distortion, and I need not reply to them.

37) Mr. Ishihara distorts my words that the task of natural science is to abstract the natural prescription that is reflected in the real world from the practice prescription and to limit it conceptually. It is his opinion that I do not consider nature, which is the object of natural science, to be a sensuous object. I think that it is Mr. Ishihara who processes the intuitive concept of nature, which is beyond sensuousness, as a scientific object.

38) The cognition that is extracted from reality must be verified by actual development and must be sublated to the more complete conceptual prescription. However, the practice to verify is not as peculiar as 'the practice' that is identical with the thought that stretches from the periphery of the thought to the object. It is only the practice that has determined the thought that develops according to the law itself and sublates the prescriptions put forth by the thought to higher prescriptions. Therefore, the concepts of thought are not verified by nature itself but by the verification practice (the
Here, I want to distinguish between the practice and the law of the practice. The practice (actuality and practicality) means reality and the unification of the interaction of the human being with nature in the human being. The laws are what the thought extracts from the actual natural moments as the moments that are inherent to the human being. While moving according to the law of the practice, the practice determines the thought, but the thought does not follow the law of the practice. My critics identified the practices of the proletariat with the definition of their historical standpoint and represented the real, sensuous, objective content outside of the practice so that the content is given in the intuitive and objective form, and the practice (active side) is independent of the interaction with the content and is identified with the thinking subject.

Therefore, this “practice” mediates the various parts of the objects outside of the practice just as they are into the consciousness without the variation caused by the interaction. However, if so, the thought needs not approach existence itself by analyzing, synthesizing, and verifying reality. We can explain the cognition only by the amount of “direct reflection.” According to my critics, the practice is the moment that is liberated from objectivity and sensuality. That is, the practice does not capture the being in itself or as the number of sensuous beings interacting with the thought, but it determines, from a different side of the existence of the thought that interacts directly with beings, and it determines the thought not directly but as a transformed thought or the subjective and psychological thought, such as a demand, a wish, an interest, or favoritism. My critics’ thoughts may fit in with the intuition of the tendency and the interest motive, but these thoughts are completely free from the actual practice.

If we make all psychological elements adaptable to the thought process as a substructure, and if we

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39) *Yuibutsuron Kenkyu* [Studies in Materialism], No. 43, p. 134. According to Mr. Kawanishi, the practice to verify only elucidates the connection of nature or history itself to the thought and does not change them. The change is “recognized after that,” even if it supposes that the practice changes them, likely due to the new “practice to verify.”

40) The ideology and the psychological process are determined by science and the logical process (the thought) and adapt to them. Practice is not reflected in the psychological process without some judgement on the thought. As what is not in the sensuousness is not in the thought, what is not in the thought is not in the ideology. The concept that is the super-structure of the thought seems to determine thought, but the fact is that the actual practice determines the thought. The will and the feeling react on the practice through reacting on the judgement and the inference of the thought as the substructure. When the law of the cognitive process is explained from the interaction of the thought and the practice, which equates to the sensuous object, the aid of the ideological factor is not necessary, as an explanation on the movement of the law of capital does not need politics.
sublate them and make the thought process adaptable to the practice as such, we stand in the position of materialism. The actual practice is the only development based on the development of productive power. The critics support the intuition of specific social conflicts that have resulted from this stage of development, and they restrict their cognition regarding reality to the intuitively grasped conflict. However, the actual conflict itself is not a fixed conflict in actual practice. The bourgeois limit is continuously sublated. This moment of sublation continuously determines the cognition restricted within this limit and sublates it. It does not mean prescribing awareness through the conception that the movement and the interest of the proletariat are an awareness appearance configuration consistent with an ideology. It does not mean that the movement and the interest of the proletariat determine the cognition through the conception as an ideological representation of the cognition. The realistic moment (the technical productive practice, the growth of the proletariat, and the growth of the various male meeting combinations reflected in it) that sublates this restriction acts on this cognition under the influence of a bourgeois restriction, sublates it, and makes it adaptable to itself. This is intuitive schematism and is the idealistic ruffling of a consciousness if turning over this fact in the consciousness and class-orientation of the cognition are understood as the standpoint that makes the movement or interest (intuition of tendency) determine and restrict the cognition and as the ideological processing of the cognition. Dialectical materialism does not understands the antagonism, as is usually the case, intuitively or as natural phenomena, but in historical development and in the interpenetration of subject and object. The cognition is not explained in the movement and the interest of the classes. Conversely, movement and interest are explained and realized by the cognition of the actual historic development. 41)

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41) The standpoint of my critics is always limited to the consciousness and is isolated from the practice. The practice always refers to the intuition of the trend (the development and the sense of interest) and has nothing to do with the tactical theory, which grasps and explains the practice, explains the basics of the trend, and realizes it. Mr. Ishihara believes that I am denying the copy theory, as I explain the movement of the theory that reflects, sublates, and integrates itself to the practice. However, my explanation agrees with the explanation in Lenin's What Is to Be Done? and "Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder. Mr. Nagata and Mr. Kawanishi forget that the tactics are always the awareness of the real practical conditions and "Marxism takes its stand on the facts, and not on possibilities" (Lenin). They represent the existence of the objective possibility (an open question) that depends on its realization of the subjective sensuous activity, and these are not realistic conditions, they stand outside of the practice, and they validate the representation according to the movement or interests of the subject. Stalin's theory of "the possibility of the victory," which Mr. Nagata often cites, is of course the real condition that the subject can use. However, according to him, it is often not recognized by the consciousness. The tactics are the thought's recognition of the moments that reflect in the relationships of the real human activity and their significance is stated objectively (outside of the consciousness).