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PRICE SQUEEZE AND CASE OF DEUTSCHE TELEKOM:ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE HIRAI, SHUMEI KAWASHIMA, YASUO NISHIMURA, NOBUFUMI この資料の著作権は、資料の著作者または学校法人中央大学に帰属します。著作権法が定める私的利用・引用を超える使用を希望される場合には、掲載誌発行部局へお問い合わせください。 price squeeze test equally efficient competitor difference in costs false positive false negative legal flaw application/pdf We explore the price squeeze test proposed by the European Commission in a partial and a no relation environments in network industries, which assumes that a new entrant is an equally efficient competitor to the incumbent firm. Under this assumption, the test in a partial regulation environment can show precisely what strategies the incumbent employs in a market, and can also show that differences in costs between the incumbent and the entrant generate either a false negative or a false positive when the one is superior in costs to the other. Moreover, the incumbent in a no regulation environment has no incentives to employ a price squeeze and the test generates a false positive in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. Thus, the test is not a reliable measure to judge strategies of the incumbent if a firm can not enjoy costs advantage. As the Commission decision is based on the test, there is a legal flaw in the procedures for judging true reasons why the entrant exists from a market. It then follows these that the Commission decision fining Deutsche Telekom should be declined. 中央大学経済研究所 2014-09-01 eng departmental bulletin paper VoR https://chuo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/6503 経済研究所 Discussion Paper IERCU Discussion Paper 232 https://chuo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/6503/files/IERCU~232~1.pdf application/pdf 249.6 kB 2019-04-22