

How to Justify Big Public Investment with Numbers : The Role of Evidences in Bidding and Implementing Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games, in Comparison with London 2012 Case

KUDO Hiroko *

Introduction: Why Sport Events and Their Legacies Matter

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Introduction: Why Sport Events and Their Legacies Matter

Strategic investment in sport and sport events in order to compete on the international stage has become an integral feature of the sport development policies among most nations competing at major international events. Researches in this area suggest that there are number of characteristics and practices that nations use to identify, develop and prepare their athletes for international sporting success (de Bosscher *et al.*, 2015, 2016; Gowthorp *et al.*, 2016; Green & Oakley 2001, Houlihan & Green 2008). However, national sport systems are heavily dependent on significant funding usually from government and/or the commercial sector. Thus, especially for the governments, it has become more and more important to legitimatise their investment not only from elite sport, also from non-sport points of view, including health and well-being of the population.

* Professor, Faculty of Law, Chuo University

This tendency has been strengthened in the last decades, while governments have been struggling under austerity budget. Governments have recognized the need to justify these big public spending through more general economic benefits to the population, thus have been keen to discuss various legacies, not only high performance sport legacies.

The research explores whether major sport events (MSE) can be a vehicle for developing high performance sport, where sport actors can leverage the MSE for government investment in sporting infrastructure and high performance sport to create high performance sport legacy and whether governments can develop various legacies besides elite sport, including economic impact, infrastructure building, community regeneration, mass sport participation, and health, in order to legitimise the big public spending, especially in time of austerity.

In order to be considered a major sporting event, Emery (2002) suggests that the event must receive national or international media coverage; have a single elite sports competition attracting a minimum of 1,000 spectators or have multiple sport competitions involving elite athletes and be sanctioned by the appropriate sport governing body. Preuss *et al.*, (2007) additionally proposed that MSEs require a large number of sport competition venues and training sites. Olympic Games as well as regional multi-sport events, such as the Pacific Games and African Games meet these characteristics and the capital investment required to stage MSEs can provide the sporting infrastructure identified as missing in many developing sport systems (Andreff, 2001; Reiche, 2016).

The direct purpose of this paper is to investigate why there have been so many different calculations of economic impact of Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games and to recalculate at least it at least for some major sites and facilities with rigorous method. In order to check the changing

calculation of the event, the paper compares it with the London 2012 Games.

The paper first examines the extent and nature of a sport legacy of MSE, with an overview of literatures, followed by a description of the cases; London 2012 Olympic Games and Tokyo 2020 Games. The results of literature review and interviews to some key actors are presented and discussed and implications for event legacy, especially that of economic impact, are considered. In doing so, this paper will try to make significant contributions to knowledge of sport policy making and in understanding use of economic impact as sport legacy.

1. Literature Review on Sport Events and Their Legacies

The sporting infrastructure required to produce medal winning athletes has been subject to extensive research, which shows that elite sport development systems have macro-, meso-, and micro-level foci. At the macro level there are contextual factors, such as a need for the general professionalization and further development of the infrastructure of an elite sport development system (de Bosscher *et al.*, 2006, 2015; Digel, 2002a, b; Oakley & Green, 2001). Second, there are factors that are not directly related to the actual support of individual athletes and coaches but which improve the management of different elite sport development systems. This cluster of support activities includes comprehensive planning for sports and the identification of priority sports (Böhlke & Robinson, 2009; de Bosscher *et al.*, 2006, 2015; Green, 2007; Reiche, 2016). Finally, at the micro level, there are a number of support services that directly affect athletes and coaches in their daily training, such as a competition structure that provides opportunities for athlete development pathways (Böhlke & Robinson, 2009; de Bosscher *et al.*, 2006, 2015; Sotiriadou *et al.*, 2008; Truyens, 2013).

It is important to note that the “trend towards a homogeneous model of elite sport systems” highlighted by Oakley and Green (2001) does not guarantee sporting success (de Bosscher *et al.*, 2008; 2015). Rather, belief in the need for such a system has emerged as it has been shown that the characteristics and practices outlined above are to be found in successful sporting nations and arguably this has coalesced into a ‘global understanding’ of an elite sport development system (de Bosscher *et al.*, 2008, 2015).

The use of sport events to leverage positive additionalities has become inherent in the rhetoric and rationale of those staging events of all types and size. Leverage refers to “those activities which need to be undertaken around the event itself...which seek to maximize the long-term benefits from events” (Chalip, 2004). To achieve this, Chalip (2004, 2006) argued that event organisers need to modify their traditional ex-post focus on legacy to an ex-ante one with a focus on using the upcoming event to leverage changes. Matheson (2010) and O’Brien (2007) advocated the imperative to leverage the legacy of sport events to justify public investment so that investment can be seen to be making a long term difference. In an extensive discussion of leveraging of mega sport events (MSEs), Smith (2014) noted that these events can be considered ‘as windows of opportunity within which to undertake initiatives’. His discussion outlines how initiatives in a range of areas such as tourism, business support, employment and healthcare have been established to leverage outcome from mega-events. Other research has identified how social impact (Chalip, 2006), national image (Grix, 2013), and community and regional image (O’Brien, 2007) can be leveraged through sport events.

A range of research has sought to define and categorise various types of sport event legacy (Thomson *et al.*, 2013; Veal *et al.*, 2012). Frawley

(2011) suggested MSE's legacies can fall into the following 10 categories, while acknowledging that there can be overlap between them: economic impact; non sporting built environment; public life (related to the focus of this paper), politics and culture; information (the focus of this paper) and education about sport; elite performance sport; mass participation sport (related to the focus of this paper); the financial/administrative support of sport; sport physical infrastructure; sporting symbols, memory, history; and health (related to the focus of this paper). Within these categories the legacies may be a combination of intended or unintentional, positive or negative, tangible or intangible, or material or non-material (Preuss, 2015). Horne (2014) further differentiated legacies into selective to universal legacies, based on the number of people they affect. Thus investigating a MSE legacy requires obtaining the perspectives of a range of the event's stakeholders, which was the approach taken in the research set out in this paper.

In addition, sport event legacies don't occur automatically and for a MSE to leave positive legacies requires planning and resourcing by event organisers and other major stakeholders in the host city and nation, coordinated through a planned, integrated, and resourced event legacy strategy. Indeed, Chalip & Leyns (2002) argued that ex-ante approach requires legacy stakeholders to have both opportunity and resources to leverage the event in order to benefit from the event. As sport is the focus of an MSE, one positive legacy should be to sport itself. For example, planning is needed for high performance (HP) and recreational sport participation and educational programs, opportunities for coaching, and well-planned, accessible facilities, which will serve ongoing community and high performance sports' needs (Weed *et al.*, 2009).

2. London Olympic and Paralympic Games Case Study

2.1. London 2012 and Its Legacies

London 2012 has been a success not only for its elite sport performance with its historical number of medals, but also for its various soft legacies, including sporting habit of ordinary citizen, health effect, and voluntary activities, which positively have affected the citizens' welfare and well-being. The part examines the UK sport policy and London legacies in order to address its potentials and issues, considering them also in a perspective toward Tokyo 2020.

According to the official documentations cited in the references and issued by the government and the institutions related to the 2012 Games, London 2012 legacy includes sporting, economic, cultural, and environmental benefits, and aims to ensure that no "white elephants" were created by the 2012 Summer Olympics and 2012 Summer Paralympics. The London 2012 Olympic Legacy is the longer-term benefits and effects of the planning, funding, building and staging of the Olympic and Paralympic Games in summer 2012. It is described as follows:

- 1) economic – supporting new jobs and skills, encouraging trade, inward investment and tourism;
- 2) sporting – continuing elite success, development of more sports facilities and encouraging participation in schools sports and wider;
- 3) social and volunteering – inspiring others to volunteer and encouraging social change
- 4) regeneration – reuse of venues, new homes, improved transportation, in East London and at other sites across the UK.

Examples of the 2012 legacy benefits and results include:

- 1) learning – shared knowledge and lessons learned from the construction of the Olympic Park and preparing and staging the Games;
- 2) economic – 2012 apprenticeships in broadcasting companies;
- 3) sporting – reports that school sports participation has not been boosted and may not be being taken seriously;
- 4) regeneration – the re-opening of the Olympic Park as the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park;
- 5) tourism – the Games' long term benefits on London's and Britain's tourism industry.

Since the London 2012 Paralympic Games finished on 9 September 2012 the UK Government has unveiled an updated Legacy Plan. Its main points include:

- 1) funding for elite sport until Rio 2016;
- 2) investment to turn the Olympic site into the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park;
- 3) 20 major sporting events to UK by 2019, with more bids in progress;
- 4) £1bn investment over the next five years in the Youth Sport Strategy, linking schools with sports clubs and encouraging sporting habits for life;
- 5) introduction of the School Games programme to boost schools sport and county sport festivals;
- 6) continued funding for International Inspiration, the UK's international sports development programme, to 2014.

London 2012 legacies were discussed before, during, and after the event. The key actors started to consider them prior to the bidding and continued to revise them.

Criticism of the legacy includes the legacy not meeting its original ambitions with a decrease in 2014/15 in the number of people playing sport

for at least half an hour a week. As a matter of fact, the ticketing data should have contributed to analyse the sport and exercise activities of the population and their health and socio-economic conditions, thus to contribute to improve the policy making of related areas; however neither the ticketing data has not been fully utilised for the related policies of the following period, nor the survey data of sport activities of the population has not been collected and analysed in optimal way (see next section for details).

The questioners were reanalysed by our statistic experts and sports experts between June and September 2017: they found some methodological and analytical issues in the original reports. The survey has been designed in different ways and not in the same way, even the questions varied from year to year, and the responses have been analysed in rather superficial way. The author conducted several experimental surveys with her Japanese colleagues among Japanese high school students between June and July 2017, using the same questioners translated in Japanese and found some significant differences, partially due to cultural differences of the respondents, partially due to the methodological differences. These experiments showed us that the same sets of questioners can results in completely different data when asked differently, even to similar respondents.

The difficulty of data analysis is not only caused by methodological issues and thus the accuracy of dataset itself, but also from the analytical tools we have and we can employ. The statistic experts of our team found the existing reports on the surveys in UK not addressing various issues which could be interesting for the policy makers, considering the impact on health conditions of the Millennials. We were not able to understand that these omissions were due to the political reasons or technical reasons, but in any case, it is possible to note that several significant results were not mentioned

in the reports.

On one side, we know that having data and/or information does not mean that we have a full understand of them and thus we can fully use them; however we also come to know that sometimes having accurate data itself is very difficult and/or analysing accurately the data/information is further difficult.

In the next section, the author tries to understand some of the reasons why data has not been utilised, through a case study of ticketing data of London 2012.

2.2. Research through Interviews to Key Actors

This research has been financed by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), Research ID: 16K13004 (2016–2018). The author conducted series of semi-structured interview to the key actors of 2012 London Olympic Games between November 2016 and May 2017. The interviews were conducted without recording but with detailed transcriptions, in order to encourage interviewees to express freely their opinions and views.

The aim of this research is to investigate whether the 2012 London Olympic Games left positive legacies. The research approach is a single case of the 2012 Olympic Games with an embedded design (Yin 2014). Data were collected from two sources: semi structured interviews to key actors and written documents available in the public domain. Case study research is appropriate for this research as it makes use of multiple sources of evidence in order to create a picture of the phenomenon under investigation and is methodologically appropriate when exploring complex issues, those that occur over an extended time period (Gratton & Jones, 2010) or when researchers have little or no influence on the event being studied (Yin, 2014) such as in this research.

Document analysis is appropriate in this case based research as documents are a rich source of data and in this instance they provided valuable primary data. Documentary analysis of strategic plans, policy documents, games reports, social media, and ticketing data set itself contributed to the understanding of the case study in three ways. First, the document analysis allowed the context for the case study to be understood, prior to the interviews and data collection. It also provided a historical account of the planning of the Games at its earliest stages. Finally, using document analysis also allowed for triangulation of data obtained through the interviews.

The interviews have been organized as a part of preliminary research of the project and with the collaboration of the local research partner. The list of the interviews is as follows.

As Dr. Mackintosh's recent PhD work (June 2016) was on "challenge of delivering a mass participation legacy", in which he conducted 53 interviews, 5 focus groups and two ethnographic studies examining mass legacy of London 2012 (undertaken over 2010-2016 period in UK), a preliminary interview was conducted with Dr. Mackintosh, then followed the others. Main questions were on various legacies that the interviewees have been in charge of in terms of research or in practice. Legacy related issues were discussed with Prof. Fowler, Prof. James, Mr. Fitzboydon, Mr. Allen, Mr. Lee, Ms. Boggis, Ms. Nicholl, and Mr. Bingham. General evaluation on legacies was the main topic of interview with Prof. James, Ms. Boggis, and Prof. Little, who advised UK government on the issue.

Some interviewees noted that the underuse of evidences was due to several reasons: first, the data gathering started without clear ideas how to use them, thus had some fundamental issues from the beginning; second, the data analysis has been done in fragmented way and not systematically, thus

Table 1: List of the interviews

| Date | Name | Title/role | Organization |
|------------|------------------------|--|--|
| 07/11/2016 | Margaret Nolan | Representative | British Taekwondo |
| | Simon Mackintosh | Assistant Head Teacher | Wilmslow High School |
| 08/11/2016 | Christopher Mackintosh | Senior Lecturer | Manchester Metropolitan University Business School (MMUBS) |
| | Neil Fowler | Professor, Head of Department | MMU, Department of Exercise and Sport Science |
| | Catherine Elliott | Senior Lecturer | MMUBS, Department of Management |
| | Rory Shand | Lecturer | MMU |
| | Mark James | Professor, Director of Research | MMU, Faculty of Business and Law, Manchester Law School |
| 09/11/2016 | Yvonne Harrison | CEO | Greater Manchester Sport |
| | Peter Fitzboydon | CEO | London Sport |
| | Tom Mapp | National Schools Development Manager | Rugby Football Union (ex Youth Sport Trust School Games lead and British Softball/ Baseball) |
| 10/11/2016 | Eugene Minogue | CEO | Parkour UK |
| | Hayley Fitzgerald | | Get Set to GO - Mind |
| | James Allen | Director of Policy, Governance, and External Affairs | Sport and Recreation Alliance (SRA) |
| | Lee Mason | CEO | CSP Network |
| 11/11/2016 | Emma Boggis | CEO | SRA (ex 10 Downing Street Officer) |
| 27/02/2017 | Liz Nicholl | CEO | UK Sport |
| | Jerry Bingham | Research Manager | UK Sport |
| 30/05/2017 | Joyce Liddle | Professor | Université Aix-Marseille |

the potential was not fully activated; third, various actors had different ideas without any coordination; and fourth and most importantly, many actors did not realise the potential of the data, especially when they started to collect the data.

So, why the data are often ignored and not utilised for policy making? The interviewees, especially from political institutions and sport related associations, pointed out the lack of awareness of the key actors, the lack of coordination among these, the difficulty of analysis, and the difficulty in interpretation of data and especially in translating into public policy. Now the data can be utilised, but many policy makers have no clear idea how to analyse it and to use it for policy-making. Indeed the data can be analysed in various ways and can be interpreted in different ways. Thus, the same set of data can actually result in completely opposite policies. This is the reason why data is not the only determinant of policy making and is rather difficult to make the accurate use of it, because of the multiplicity of its interpretation.

Mr. Fitzboydon of London Sport recalled the high expectation by various actors for collecting and using “Big Data” for policy-making, which, however, proved to be difficult in reality. He indeed pointed out the necessity of accurate design of the whole process in advance, even before starting to think about collecting data. He mentioned that “Tokyo 2020 would be an interesting test bed for big data, given the advanced technology and the possibility to use it in the hosting country as well as the general advancement and understanding of policy-making using big data by the time of the event” and that he is “expecting that Tokyo 2020 to be an advanced technology test bed, including big data analysis”.

3. Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games Case Study

3.1. Legacies

Tokyo 2020 legacies have been so far strongly concentrated on infrastructure and economy, prioritising major infrastructure investment and tourism investment. Other legacies, especially so-called soft legacies, have not been strongly promoted so far.

The Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games issued an action and legacy plan with five pillars: sport and health; urban planning and sustainability; culture and education; economy and technology; and recovery, nationwide benefits, and global communication (The Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games, 2016). The committee stresses the importance of an “all-Japan” team structure, consisting of the national government, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG), regional and local authorities, the Japanese Olympic Committee (JOC), the Japanese Paralympic Committee (JPC), the Japanese sporting and business communities and other stakeholders, which works closely together to implement a wide range legacy-focused actions. The committee will establish a post-Games follow-up structure and plans to compile a Legacy Report. Although the committee stresses the need of various stakeholders promoting actions based on the Plan, the legacy promoting plans of stakeholders vary among them and are not necessary in harmony with the committee’s plan.

Current situation of each pillar is as follows.

- 1) sport and health: discussions are ongoing regarding specific actions and legacies to be passed on to future generations in this field and on ensuring the realisation of the “Athlete First” concept.

- 2) urban planning and sustainability: The Urban Planning and Sustainability Commission was established in June 2015 and holds discussions on specific actions on the creation of universally-usable urban spaces, accessibility around the vicinity of Games competition venues, and sustainable Games operations aimed at providing positive Games legacies.
- 3) culture and education: The Culture and Education Commission, established in May 2015, holds discussions on specific actions in media arts, traditional culture and other culturally-related fields, as well as specific actions for the education of the Olympics and Paralympics from elementary to high school levels.
- 4) economy and technology: The Economy and Technology Commission was founded in June 2015 and discusses the formulation of specific actions aimed at revitalising Japanese regional economies, and promoting awareness of information and communication technology (ICT) and other leading technologies.
- 5) recovery, nationwide benefits, and global communication: The Media Commission was set up in September 2014 and discusses specific actions and legacies aimed at assisting the recovery from the 2011 earthquake and tsunami disaster, communicating unique aspects of Japan to a global audience, etc. This pillar is a quite unique one and reflected the discussion of the period of bidding. With the circumstances development, thus, this pillar has been modified in its characteristics.

Although the above mentioned Committee is working under the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG), the TMG itself, one of the most important stakeholders of the event, however, has developed its own legacy plan, which has slightly different objectives as well as concepts, reflecting the functions and duties of its departments and bureaus. As a local government,

it focuses especially on two pillars, infrastructure and human resources with very strong stress on the first.

Because of construction trouble of the first plan of the main stadium designed by Zaha Hadid and the following decision to abandon it, the national government as well as major stakeholders had abandoned the previous legacy plan (TMG, 2015) has been focused mostly on infrastructure-related legacies. Indeed the TMG has recalculated the cost of all sporting and non-sporting facilities in 2016 and proposed to downsize some of the facilities and reallocate some to the nearby prefectures. During this recalculation, most of the cost as well as economic impact initially publicised by the government was revised and drastically modified. For example, the recalculation of construction cost of the new boat race field to which the author took part in revealed that the initial calculation has ignored various aspects and thus the recalculated cost was almost tripled from the original one.

Since then, the legacies focused by the TMG are sporting facilities and the athletes, leaving the others unmentioned. Even for the first pillar “sport and health”, although the health issue has remained as the core objective with indicators like citizen practicing sport more than once a week, health related legacies completely disappeared from its documents. Beside some of the legacies have been re-developed by the national government and other stakeholders, the TMG has been focusing mostly on infrastructures. In the next section the author tried to explain the reason and the problem of data and calculation with concrete examples.

3.2. Interviews and Direct Observations

As the official prediction of economic impact announced by the TMG has drastically changed during the 2016 recalculation, the author conducted

some interviews to the key officials of the TMG, who were in the position to access the data and were aware of the recalculation procedure, to verify both the data and the calculation.

As all of the interviewees asked not to be identified, the results of the interviews would be a summary of them, thus quite limited in its validity, but shows some very important facts on how the raw data is collected and elaborated to become official figures of economic impact of various investments, etc. All agreed to the reason why the initial figures published in the bidding report were all so optimistic: the report was prepared by a private think tank, responding to the at the time governor, thus, they claim, that the firm would had interests in making the image better for its business reasons. The economic impact of the Game was recalculated by the Bureau for the Preparation of Olympic and Paralympic Games in early 2017 and the figures became much more realistic. The at that time head of the bureau told the author that the recalculation used the latest figures of the Japanese economic and the economic impact generated by the last two Games, namely London 2012 and Rio 2016. He, however, failed to explain the details of the calculation procedure, which makes it difficult to recreate the whole process.

The author is aware of the limitation of the interviews; however, the majority of the respondents noticed that the recalculation procedure which took place between 2016 and 2017 forced them to think the validity of the available data and the model for the predictions. One of the interviewees noted the difficulty of getting “right and accurate” data and “calculating the predictions” through models and past experiences. Indeed, it seems that the majority of past predictions merely were an assumption; based partially on the data, but mostly created ad hoc by those published the data.

During the recalculation, the author participated directly and/or indirectly

to the procedure and found it difficult as well as complicated. As the author has taken part in the process, it is possible to confirm that the most of the initial data was provided by the outside sources without or scarce explanations. The whole recalculation process started to doubt the existing data and ask related organizations to provide all available information and check it with experts of the field. For instance, the above mentioned recalculation of the boat race field showed that the initial cost calculation was based on a general and simplified assumption, without considering the characteristics of the real construction site, thus ignoring several factors which could condition the construction as well as the game. So was the estimated renovation cost of the swimming pool, which did not take into account the structural issue caused by the additional seating required by the Olympic Game standard.

Forced by the public critiques, raised mainly by the mismanagement of the main stadium, the TMG also recalculated the economic impact of the game and published the new estimation in 2017. Estimated data on foreign visitors during the game, job creation through tourism and related industries, economic impact by visitors and domestic demands, and investment by the government and private sector was created based on the past Games, not considering the characteristics of the location and/or the differences in the conditions. The estimated number of the visitors, for example, was not a fruit of marketing or questioner, but just an estimate from the recent trend.

After several recalculations of the construction cost of some critical facilities and estimation of economic impact, the author started to question the validity of data on which most of these elaborations come from, the way they make estimation and publish, and the legitimacy of it to become the basis of policy-making and spending. Besides the various sophisticated tools

to generate data, it seems that the TMG has been using data with little validity not because of the lack of capacity to create valid data, but because the initially published data was in line with the politics at that time.

What is, then, the neutrality of the data? From the direct experience of the whole recalculation, it seems that the data has been manipulated by the policy makers and used in favour of them. On one hand, the same set of data has been interpreted in different ways; on the other, they have used different available set of data to support their idea. In the next section, the author tried to compare the two cases to draw several findings from the empirical researches.

4. Comparative Analysis, Lesson Learned, and Findings

The limitation of this research is that it is heavily dependent on literature research for its framework while the empirical case is limited in its numbers, the interviews are also limited, although cover a good range of stakeholders, and strongly relying on direct observation of the author. It indeed still lacks many key actors to interview for both cases and analysis of various procedures.

Also the theories used for the interpretation are limited and could be widened with other points of view. The research, though, tries to contribute to the discussion on why evidence-based policy making is sometimes difficult, because of various reasons, some of which not being discussed so much so far. Both cases – London and Tokyo Games – differ in their issues of using data: the former has had many accurate data, but suffered lack of awareness and strategic design, coordination problem among institutions, and political willingness of using existing data for policy-making; while the latter has had so far mix quality of data, partially because of

technical reasons and partially due to political unwillingness to rely on data, unsystematic use of data in designing plans and policies, and politicised use of data. The major issues of the two cases are indeed very different, although the cases have the same characteristics of major sort events such as Olympic Games and share various problems.

The both cases show that the data-based policy making is, at least in practice, not as easy as many claim, for various reasons. The first is an example of a case that existence of data is not directly connected to policy making, while the latter is a typical case of data fluctuation caused by political and non-political reasons.

The latter needs more detailed and closed analysis, as the reasons of data variation have not been clarified through the limited number of interviews and direct observation of recalculation practices. This procedure has a big potential, as the author has an exclusive access to data as well as the process. Given the major limitation of this research is on this point, the future research aims to focus on this and clarify why certain data is employed in certain procedure, while others in other circumstances. The further step would be on evidence-based policy making, not only in its traditional areas, but also in other, new emerging areas, including use of general data, not necessary the typical evidences. On this regard, sport related policy is an interesting area and thus is worth continuing to investigate.

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