

Language as Mediation Ohta, Kohtarō (2018)

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1. Language: The Existence of Spirit

Hegel defines “language [*Sprache*]” as “the existence of spirit [*das Dasein des Geistes*]” (Hegel 1977a, pp. 395, 405; see Hegel 1977a, p. 402) or “visible invisibility of its (= spirit's) essence” (Hegel 1977a, p. 195). Considering this, we presume that language has an intimate relationship with spirit, which is one of the key concepts of Hegel's philosophy,¹⁾ in which language plays an important role. In addition to “spirit [*Geist*],” other important notions of Hegel's philosophy, such as “thought [*Denken*],” “subject [*Subjekt*],” “mediation [*Vermittlung*],” and “the absolute [*das Absolute*],” are considered in connection with language.

Hegel considers both “thought” and “language” as part of the power of spirit which sublates the immediate and shows the substance of objects.²⁾ Language and thought are therefore mutually

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1) Hegel also prescribes language as “the pure existence of spirit [*die reine Existenz des Geistes*]” (Hegel 1971a, S. 106-107).

2) While Hegel says, “language is the destruction of the sensible world in its immediate existence [*die*

inseparable, and “the forms of thought are initially shown and laid down in human language [*die Denkformen sind zunächst in der Sprache des Menschen herausgesetzt und niedergelegt*]” (Hegel 1969, S. 20). Humans describe the substance of things with language energized by thought, and thought can be perceived in the original sense only when it is composed in language.

Hegel says, “the logical (= thought and language) is so natural to him (= man), or much more: it is his peculiar nature itself [*so sehr natürlich ist ihm (= dem Menschen) das Logische (= das Denken und die Sprache), oder vielmehr: dasselbige ist seine eigentümliche Natur selbst*]” (Hegel 1969, S. 20). For Hegel, language and thought are the most profound elements of the human being.

Hegel did not treat language systematically, but it holds an important place in his philosophy; rather, his philosophical system was not possible without the element of language. This is clear in his well-known thesis on “substance = subject.”

In my view, which can be justified only by the exposition [*Darstellung*] of the system itself, everything turns on grasping and expressing [*ausdrücken*] the True, not only as *Substance*, but equally as *Subject*. (Hegel 1977a, pp. 9–10)

[T]hat Substance is essentially Subject, is expressed [*ausgedrückt*] in representation [*aussprechen*] of the Absolute as *Spirit*. (Hegel 1977a, p. 14)

“Exposition [*Darstellung*],” “express [*ausdrücken*],” and “represent [*aussprechen*]” in the above citations are words often used in *Phenomenology of Spirit* and hold an intimate relationship with Hegel’s view on language.³⁾

Sprache ist Ertötung der sinnlichen Welt in ihrem unmittelbaren Dasein]” (Hegel 1970b, S. 52), he also says, “thinking is essentially the negation of something immediately present [*das Denken wesentlich die Negation eines unmittelbar Vorhandenen*]” (Hegel 1970a, S. 57 [§ 12]).

- 3) Hegel defines the words “*aussprechen*,” “*ausdrücken*” and “*darstellen*” differently in *Phenomenology of Spirit*. “*Aussprechen*” is used in the context of the externalization of consciousness (subject): “Scientific cognition, on the contrary, demands surrender to the life of the object, or, what amounts to the same thing, confronting and expressing (= *aussprechen*) its inner necessity” (Hegel 1977a, p. 32). “*Ausdrücken*” is used generally in the context of describing the objective of consciousness objectively: “the law wants to grasp and express (= *ausdrücken*) the antithesis as inert aspects, and in them the determinateness which is their relation to one another” (Hegel 1977a, p. 167). In addition, “*ausdrücken*” implicates the internalization of the objective: “*the outer is the expression (=Ausdrück) of the inner*” (Hegel 1977a, p. 160). “*Darstellen*” is used in the context of “we” which grasps both the externalization of consciousness (*aussprechen*) and the internalization of the object (*ausdrücken*) and unifies them; “the Ego is both *ideal* and *real* activity, the distinction being merely a matter of direction; it has united these different directions in particular incomplete syntheses such as drive and feeling, as will be shown below; but it does not achieve a complete exposition (= *Darstellung*) of itself in them” (Hegel 1977b, p. 135).

The core of Hegel's philosophy is to grasp the Absolute as the process of "its own becoming [*Selbstwerden*]" (Hegel 1977a, p. 10) and express [*ausdrücken*] it using language. The purpose of *Phenomenology of Spirit* is to express the process of this "own becoming" through the scrutiny of what consciousness represents. Hegel's exposition [*Darstellung*] of the system indicates that consciousness develops the expression in our presence through the mediation of language and exposes [*darstellen*] it. To expose the becoming of the Absolute through the mediation of language is "speculative exposition" (Hegel 1977a, p. 40).

Hegel calls this becoming of the Absolute "Spirit." According to Hegel's formulation, "Spirit is the knowledge of oneself in the externalization of oneself; the being that is the movement of retaining its self-identity in its otherness" (Hegel 1977a, p. 459; see Hegel 1977a, pp. 21, 590).

"I" must externalize its subjectivity and identity itself with the others to become the universal "I." With the element of Spirit, "I" can pursue both being itself and fundamental identity with the others. Habermas says, "Spirit is the communication of individuals through the medium of a universal [*Geist ist die Kommunikation Einzelner im Medium eines Allgemeinen*]" (Habermas 1968, S.15). Spirit is, in essence, the mediation, expressly, the 'I's becoming "I which is for itself" (Hegel 1977a, p. 11) through its own externalization.

Language is what realizes and mediates this movement. Hegel was certain that language can and must express this movement of the Spirit completely and was proud of the uniqueness of his philosophy based on this certainty. The movement of Spirit, which is the development of the individual "I" to the universal "I," achieves its real existence in the element of language. According to Hegel, "I" can be both this "I" and the universal "I" only in language (see Hegel 1977a, pp. 308-309).

2. Language as the Negation of Intuition (The Immediate)

As language is the existence of spirit as explained above, it apparently can never be a fixed being. As the spirit must be grasped as a self-becoming "activity [*Tätigkeit, Energie*],"⁴⁾ language as its existence must be grasped as continually developing to mediate the human and the world. For Hegel, as for Humboldt, language is not "ergon (ἔργον)" but "energeia (ἐνέργεια)," or it could be "not the dead product, but always active production" (Miki 1966, p. 169). Due to Hegel's view on language, he scrutinizes words, which consciousness represents [*aussprechen*], and the development

4) Hegel's point is that the spirit is not a being without process, but it is the activity and "the spirit must be seen essentially in its concrete reality, in its energy as the necessary externalization of itself by its inner self [*Der Geist ist wesentlich in seiner konkreten Wirklichkeit, in seiner Energie zu betrachten, und zwar so, daß die Äußerungen derselben als durch seine Innerlichkeit bestimmt erkannt werden*]" (Hegel 1970a, S. 101 [§ 34 Zusatz]).

of consciousness in favor of fostering the dialectical development.⁵⁾

As Hegel says, “language expresses only the universal [*die Sprache ausdrückt nur Allgemeines*]” (Hegel 1970a, S. 74 [§20]; see Hegel 1977a, p. 60). However, as we will investigate later, the universality of language asserted by Hegel is not an abstract, fixed property which excludes the individual. It is rather that which includes the individual into itself, develops itself, expresses its contents completely at the end, and acquires true universality. Therefore, language could be called the subject that “generates itself, going forth from itself, and returning to itself” (Hegel 1977a, p. 40).

For example, if we simply say, “the Absolute,” the word lacks substance and has no prescriptions of its contents.

When I say ‘all animals,’ this expression cannot pass for zoology, so it is equally plain that the words, ‘Divine,’ ‘the Absolute,’ ‘the Eternal,’ etc., do not express what is contained in them.⁶⁾ (Hegel 1977a, p. 11)

What is said immediately is “intuition [*Anschauung*],” which for Hegel is only a contentless name and “the fixed point of rest” (Hegel 1977a, p. 40). The intuition or the immediate overcomes its abstractness through its self-development and expresses its contents in the end, becoming concrete and universal. Hegel says, “only in the end of the proposition does the empty beginning become actual knowledge” (Hegel 1977a, pp. 12–13).

The intuition believes that it grasps the object concretely; however, it becomes “empty words [*das leere Wort*]” (Hegel 1977a, pp. 234, 465),⁷⁾ which have no contents and prescriptions if expressed in language. Language sublates the immediacy of the intuition and gives it content. Therefore, we

5) According to Cook, Hegel illustrates in *Phenomenology of Spirit* “the dialectical nature of experience by analyzing the language used by consciousness to describe its particular *Weltanschauung*” (Cook 1973, p. 42).

6) Concerning the abstract “God” which is referred to directly, Hegel says, “God as the abstract otherworldly being, which does not include the difference and the determinateness in it, is in fact a mere name, a mere *caput mortuum* of the abstracting understanding [*Gott als das abstrakte jenseitige Wesen, außerhalb dessen hiermit der Unterschied und die Bestimmtheit fällt, ist in der Tat ein bloßer Name, ein bloßes caput mortuum des abstrahierenden Verstandes*]” (Hegel 1970a, S. 234 [§ 112 Zusatz]).

7) Hegel distinguishes “*Sprache* (=language)” and “*Wort* (=word)” in *Phenomenology of Spirit*. “*Sprache*” always has a positive meaning and “*Wort*,” except for a few examples (for example: Hegel 1977a, p. 465), means the negative, expressly, what has no content and is abstract. Example: “when I say, ‘all animals,’ this expression (=Wort) cannot pass for zoology, so it is equally plain that the words (=Worte), ‘the Divine,’ ‘the Absolute,’ ‘the Eternal,’ etc., do not express what is contained in them” (Hegel 1977a, p. 11; see Hegel 1977a, pp. 13, 48, 122).

could say that, following Parain, “[i]f we left it there, we might believe that language quite simply lets the content of this intuition get lost. On the contrary, it (=language) will work to restore it [*Si nous en restions là, nous pourrions croire que le langage laisse tout simplement se perdre le contenu de cette intuition. Au contraire va-t-il travailler à le rétablir*]” (Parain 1942, p. 144).

Both language and thought are the negation of the intuition (= the immediate) and the mediation. If labor is “desire held in check” (Hegel 1977a, p. 118), then language could be “intuition held in check.” Both language and labor are equally the results of the separation and sublation of the human from the immediate.⁸⁾

3. Language as the Body of Thought

To grasp the Absolute, not through the mediation of language but by the immediate, is to rely on the unspeakable [*das Unsagbare, das Unaussprechliche*]. It is to contain the Absolute into the individual and sensuous and to give up the cognition of the Universal. Therefore, Hegel says:

[T]he unspeakable, feeling, sensation, is not the most excellent, the truest, but the most unimportant, the most untrue [*das Unsagbare, Gefühl, Empfindung, ist nicht das Vortrefflichste, Wahrste, sondern das Unbedeutendste, Unwahrste*]. (Hegel 1970a, S. 74[§20]; vgl. Hegel 1970c, S. 280)

According to Hegel, to make feeling and intuition the absolute foundation and to rely on the unspeakable carry the same meaning; it is to negate the Universality of the human and should be dismissed as “the untrue, the irrational” (Hegel 1977a, p. 66). If the human despises language as “the supreme gifts of man” and depends on the sensuous and unspeakable, then one will give oneself “to the devil and must perish” (Hegel 1977a, p. 218), as Mephistopheles predicted.

To reject the Universal and limit oneself to the individual and the immediate is to become “the anti-human [*das Wiedermenschliche*]” (Hegel 1977a, p. 43), because it rejects agreement with others and is against communality, which is a key element of human substance. The individual self should realize agreement with others to become “the universal self” (Hegel 1977a, p. 296), which is one’s own substance. “I that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’” is “the Notion of Spirit” (Hegel 1977a, p. 110) and the element in which the original human appears. Hegel summarizes his idea of the human as follows:

8) Hegel says labor is “the result of the disjunction (between nature and human) as well as the overcoming of it [*das Resultat der Entzweiung als auch die Überwindung derselben*]” (Hegel 1970a, S. 89 [§ 24 Zusatz 3]). This would be true for language.

It is the nature of humanity to press onward to agreement with others; human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds. (Hegel 1977a, p. 43)

Therefore, if the human denies communality (the human substance) with others and retains that the sensuous equals the individual,⁹⁾ it is, for Hegel, to “underfoot the roots of humanity” (Hegel 1977a, p. 43). Language is what sublates the individuality of the sensuous and makes the universal within it appear.

Language externalizes the self-consciousness and internalizes the sensuous. Language gives universality to existence through the “annihilation of the sensuous world in its immediate existence [*Ertötung der sinnlichen Welt in ihrem unmittelbaren Dasein*]” (Hegel 1970b, S. 52). The sensuous must be sublated in language and become the universal self-consciousness, because the universal exists in the sensuous, and language brings the universal to the surface. A being speaks about its subsistence using language.

When language expresses the universal subsistence, thought must also function there. As explained above, language and thought hold an intimate relationship. When Hegel says language is “the work of thought [*das Werk des Gedankens*]” (Hegel 1970a, S. 74 [§ 20]), we should not assume that thought is more fundamental than language. Language is not the provisional container of thought, it is rather “the body of thought [*der Leib des Denkens*]” (Hegel 1970a, S. 286 [§ 145 Zusatz]). Hyppolite says tactfully, “[l]anguage *precedes and expresses thought*” (Hyppolite 1997, p. 43). We cannot separate language and thought just as we cannot separate mind and body.¹⁰⁾ If we separate them, they will be reduced to simply “an opening talk” or “conversation” (Hegel 1977a, pp. 1, 29).

In this sense, language must be the existence of thought. Thought can express itself only in language, and language can be true language only through thought; the two are inseparable in this way. As Bodammer says, “[l]anguage already implies thinking, and thinking is not without language [*Sprache impliziert bereits Denken, und Denken ist nicht ohne Sprache*]” (Bodammer 1969, S. 60).

9) As elements of the sensuous, Hegel presents “the individuality [*die Einzelheit*]” and “the outside-each-other [*das Außeneinander*]” (Hegel 1970a, S. 74 [§ 20]).

10) As I will refer to it later, according to Hegel, language is “reason” and the unity of “thing and discourse [*Sache und Sage*]” (vgl. Hegel 1976b, S. 190). Nevertheless, language will not express the nature of things and offer nonsense, “but this is not the fault of the word, but that of a deficient, indefinite, meaningless thinking [*dies ist aber nicht die Schuld des Wortes, sondern die eines mangelhaften, unbestimmten, gehaltlosen Denkens*]” (Hegel 1970c, S. 280). Language can express the nature of things when united with true thinking. Hegel also calls attention to the possibility that the distinction between language and things, and the emphasis of things could prevent the conceptual grasp of things (vgl. Hegel 1970d, S. 247–248).

We can sublimate the individuality of the sensuous and place it in the element of universality only through language as “the body of thought.” Language gouges the universal in the sensuous.

4. The Sensuous “This Thing” and Language: Interpreting *Phenomenology of Spirit’s* First Chapter

The discussion thus far corresponds to Hegel’s description of sensuous consciousness at the beginning of *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

In the first chapter of *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel begins his description of the experience of consciousness with the immediate belief in the object. However, he points out the contradiction between what the consciousness thinks of [*meinen*] and what it expresses in language [*aussprechen*]. Sense-consciousness believes that it grasps the object in front of it. However, when it uses language to express its belief, it expresses only “the universal” against its intention to express the concrete objects before it.

The direct and individual object defined by the word “this” as expressed by the sense-consciousness is not the purely individual and immediate object, but the universal that is mediated by other instances of “this.”

When we sensuously believe in something in front of us as “this” and express it as “this thing” or “this desk,” we think of this desk as something individual in front of us. However, “this desk” expressed in language is not something individual but universal, because we can call every other desk other than this one “this desk.”

Of course, we do not *envisage* the universal This or Being in general, but we *utter* the universal; in other words, we do not strictly say what in this sense-certainty we *mean* to say. (Hegel, 1977a, p. 60)

Hegel says that language always expresses the universal; however, the universal is not what ignores and contradicts the individual. If the universal contradicts the individual, it becomes one of the particulars contradicting the individuals, as often said by Hegel. The universal exists by means of negation of the individual; therefore, it must contain the latter as a negative moment. This is apparent because as Hegel says when defining the universal, “[a] simple thing of this kind which is through negation, which is neither This nor That, a *not-This*, and is with equal indifference This as well as That—such a thing we call a *universal*.” (Hegel 1977a, p. 60)¹¹⁾

Hegel’s remark, “the language only expresses the universals, so I cannot say what I mean [*die*

11) Hyppolite interprets the universal as “the universal opposed to the individual and mediated by it [*l’universel opposé au singlier et médiatisé par lui*]” (Hyppolite 1978, p. 93).

Sprache nur Allgemeines ausdrückt, so kann ich nicht sagen, was ich nur meine]” (Hegel 1970a, S. 74 [§20]), does not mean that language cannot express the individual, but that it does not express only the individual.

What Hegel says here is that sense-consciousness’s grasping of the individual things itself with ingenuity is just a belief [*Meinung*], and in reality, the sensuous “this” is always mediated by language and exists as the individual.

In this sense, language is “more truthful [*das Wahrhaftere*]” (Hegel 1977a, p. 60) than what sense-consciousness thinks of.” Hegel does not ignore the existence of the sensuous and individual being; rather, he recognizes it as the true but “the most abstract and poorest *truth*” (Hegel 1977a, p. 58; see Hegel 1970a, S. 70 [§ 19 Zusatz 2], S. 182 [§ 85 Zusatz]). The sensuous must sublimate its individuality and abstractness and become the universal, and this is possible only by means of language. Therefore, language does not ignore sensuous individual things; in fact, it makes them exist. Language is the universal in that sense. The sensuous exists as the individual as its existence is realized by the universal, or language.^{12),13)}

12) Fujisawa says, “whether we like it or not, and we are unaware of it, we are potentially seeing things through language and feeling the events wrapped in language” (Fujisawa 1980, pp. 7 f.). What he says is similar to Hegel’s discussion of the sense-consciousness.

13) From our interpretation of the introductory chapter of *Phenomenology of Spirit*, we should say Feuerbach’s well-known critique of Hegel misses the point. According to Feuerbach, the contradiction of “sensuous certainty” is the “contradiction between the word, which is general, and the thing, which is always individual one [*Widerspruch zwischen dem Wort, welches allgemein, und der Sache, welche immer eine einzelne ist*]” (Feuerbach 1904, S. 287). However, according to Feuerbach “the language is not part of the matter here [*die Sprache gehört hier gar nicht zur Sache*]” (Feuerbach 1904, S. 185); so, to overcome this contradiction with language does not mean the true sublation of the contradiction. Hegel condemns sensuous “here [*hier*]” and “now [*jetzt*],” but he does not condemn the matter itself. He condemns logical “*hier*” and logical “*jetzt*” (Feuerbach 1904, S. 187). Feuerbach believes in the independent existence of the sensuous and thinks that the sensuous cannot be sublated by language. He does not find the individual unspeakable or unreasonable, but “the existence has meaning and reason for itself, even if it cannot be said [*die Existenz hat für sich selbst, auch ohne Sagbarkeit, Sinn und Vernunft*]” (Feuerbach 1904, S. 288). He claims, “where the words stop, life only begins and the secret of being is revealed [*wo die Worte aufhören, da fängt erst das leben an, erschliesst sich erst das Geheimniss des Seins*]” (Feuerbach 1904, S. 288). The basis of Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel is that the individual belongs to the thing itself, and conversely, language can express only the formally universal which ignores the individual. However, we should doubt Feuerbach’s premises. When the sensuous consciousness grasps “this thing,” it does not grasp the thing itself purely, but it is restrained by language in some way. For example, “this book” is on “this desk,” next to “this bookcase,” and in “this room” is mediated by another “this thing.” Further, “this thing” does not necessarily exist only logically, because without mediation of another “this thing” our sense for “this book” will collapse. Sense-consciousness grasps “this book” only in relationship with another “this thing.” As Cook says, “there is no such thing as a

The sense-consciousness grasps “this” as the universal and experiences that the truth of the object is not in the object itself but in the sense-consciousness itself. “Its truth is in the object as *my* object, or in its being *mine* [*Meinen*]; it is, because *I* know it” (Hegel 1977a, p. 61). Therefore, the truth of the sense-certainty is pushed from the object to the “I” and this “I” experiences the same dialectic as “this.” The sense-consciousness does not express this individual “I” which it experiences, because “when I say ‘I,’ this singular ‘I,’ I say in general all ‘Is” (Hegel 1977a, p. 62).

In this way, the truth for sense-consciousness appears both in “object” and “I” as the universal, but this universality includes the individual only as possibility. Both “this” and “this I” must develop themselves and become truly universal. As Hegel says, “[s]o then I is the general, in which everything is abstracted, but in which everything is concealed at the same time [*So ist denn Ich das Allgemeine, in welchem von allem Besonderen abstrahiert ist, in welchem aber zugleich alles verhüllt liegt*]” (Hegel 1970a, S. 83 [§ 24 Zusatz 1]); both “this” and “I” become the universal after they develop all potential prescriptions included in them.

After this, the development in *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the process by which both “this” and “I” go through all types of mediation, overcome their abstractness, and become the true “I.” Hegel describes it as “the ‘I,’ or becoming in general, this mediation, on account of its simple nature, is just immediacy in the process of becoming, and is the immediate itself” (Hegel 1977a, p. 11).

The development of “this” is the process of the internalization of the objective nature, and the development of “this I” is the externalization of “I.” These processes must be grasped with integrity. These processes are, concurrently, both the universalization of the individual and the individualization of the universal. Hegel says:

It (=the object) is, as totality, a syllogism or the movement of the universal through determination to individuality, as also the reverse movement from individuality through superseded individuality, or through determination, to the universal. (Hegel 1977a, p. 480)

meaningful experience of a particular, apart from its relations with other particulars” (Cook 1973, p. 188). Language is what expresses “this thing” and places it in the universal relationship. Hegel differs from Feuerbach and does not think that language expresses only the universal and cannot express the individual. Instead, Hegel believes that language cannot express only the individual, but sublates the individual to the universal element and gives it existence. In addition, for Feuerbach, language cannot express the sensuous individual and only expresses the universal. Thus, the fundamental role of language is the medium of I and you. “Language is nothing but the realization of the species, the mediation of the I with you, in order to represent the unity of the species through the abolition of their individual separation [*Die Sprache ist nichts Anderes, als die Realisation der Gattung, die Vermittlung des Ich mit dem Du, um durch die Aufhebung ihrer individuellen Getrenntheit die Einheit der Gattung darzustellen*]” (Feuerbach 1904, S. 169).

Language assumes this dual mediation process or the movement of a syllogism. Language has “the divine nature” (Hegel 1977a, p.66) which sublates the abstract individuality and the abstract universality to their opposites.

5. Three Properties of Language: Sign, Name, Logos

We have discussed the opening of *Phenomenology of Spirit* and have treated language as a mediator for the externalization of “I” and the internalization of sensuous objects. We could say that we have treated language as the existence of consciousness.

In his manuscripts of lectures held in Jena that concerned the philosophy of spirit, Hegel considers language as the existence of consciousness from the perspective of human dominance over nature. In his lectures, Hegel investigates the three forms of externalization: language as the product of the memory [*Gedächtnis*], tools [*Werkzeuge*] as the product of labor [*Arbeits*], and family assets [*Familiengut*] as the product of ethical relationships. Then, he searches for the means “to abolish the contradiction between subject and object completely [*den Gegensatz des Subjects und Objects vollkommen aufzuheben*]” (Hegel 1976a, S. 286).

Additionally, Hegel attempts to establish the notion of spirit by combining the three forms of externalization in organic links (vgl. Habermas 1968, S. 31f.). Language is placed in “the first order power [*die erste Potenz*]” (Hegel 1976a, S. 297), superior to the other two forms of externalization, and considered the most fundamental power.¹⁴⁾ According to Hegel, the spirit exists as “consciousness in general” and “consciousness exists first as memory and its product, language [*das Bewußtsein existiert zuerst als Gedächtnis und sein Produkt die Sprache*]” (Hegel 1976a, S.280).

Hegel sees the fundamental form of language in “sign [*Zeichen*].” Signs break Hegel’s “world of pictures [*Reich der Bilder*]” (Hegel 1976b, S. 190),¹⁵⁾ which is the indifferent and immediate world given by intuition, and re-establishes this world in relation with the subject (self). Hegel says, “the sign is some immediate intuition which presents a content entirely different from that which it has for itself [*das Zeichen ist irgendeine unmittelbare Anschauung, die einen ganz anderen Inhalt vorstellt, als den sie für sich hat*]” (Hegel 1970c, S. 270). To give a sign is the great act which enables humans to sublimate the immediacy of the outer object and absorb it.

14) As Habermas points out, in this context, language, tools, and family property are not the mutually unaffiliated categories, but they stand in multi-layered relation. The use of tools makes communication by language inevitable, and the family property is meaningless if it is separated from the mutual relationship of subjects through the use of tools (vgl. Habermas 1968, S. 32).

15) “World of pictures” is “the night in which ... all cows are black,” (Hegel 1977a, p. 9) and “the dreaming spirit [*der träumende Geist*].” (Hegel 1976b, S. 190) Hegel refers to such world of integration and calls it “night [*Nacht*]” (Hegel 1976b, S. 186f.). As Kato says, Hegel “tries to theorize the overcoming of this ‘night’ here” (Kato 1980, p. 223).

The sign must be declared to be something great. When the intelligence has given a sign to something, it has cut the relationship with the content of the perception and has given the sensual a meaning as the soul that is alien to it [*Das Zeichen muß für etwas Großes erklärt werden. Wenn die Intelligenz etwas bezeichnet hat, so ist sie mit dem Inhalte der Anschauung fertig geworden und hat dem sinnlichen Stoff eine ihm fremde Bedeutung zur Seele gegeben*]. (Hegel 1970c, S. 269)

According to Hegel, the immediate and substantial “has nothing astonishing” (Hegel 1977a, p. 18), but the negative effect of spirit, which is to negate the immediate and give it other meaning, should be called “tremendous power” (Hegel 1977a, p. 19).

The sign puts “I” in the object by pointing to the “alienated soul.” According to Hegel, “[i]n the sign, being-for-itself as the essence of the object is object [*Im Zeichen ist das Fürsichsein als Wesen des Gegenstands, Gegenstand*]” (Hegel 1976b, S. 188). Additionally, the sign is the result of the subject’s giving meaning to objects; thus, the unity of the subject and object remains arbitrary and external (vgl. Hegel 1976a, S. 286; Hegel 1970c, S. 269).¹⁶⁾ In Hegel’s words, “the subject is not sublated in it (= the sign) [*das Subjekt ist in ihm (=dem Zeichen) nicht aufgehoben*]” (Hegel 1976a, S. 287).

A name is a higher form of language than a sign. A name sublates the externality of a sign and arbitrariness and produces a new object.

Thus, through the name the object as being is borne out of the ego. This is the first creative power that the spirit exercises [*Durch den Namen ist also der Gegenstand als seiend aus dem Ich heraus geboren. – Dies ist die erste Schöpferkraft, die der Geist ausübt*]. (Hegel 1976b, S. 189–190)

As Adam named all things and dominated the whole nature ideologically,¹⁷⁾ so is to give a name “the creation of the whole nature from the spirit [*das Schaffen derselben (=der ganzen nature) aus dem Geiste*]” (Hegel 1976b, S. 190).¹⁸⁾

16) Hegel explains the externality of signs in *Phenomenology of Spirit*. For example, he says “it is therefore indeed an expression, but at the same time only in the sense of a *sign*, so that the particular way in which the content is expressed is a matter of complete indifference so far as the content itself is concerned” (Hegel 1977a, p. 190). His view of signs did not change from his time in Jena to *Enzyklopädie*. Concerning his treatment of signs, see Hegel 1977a, pp. 186, 188, 190, 194, 201.

17) Hegel refers to Adam’s naming (vgl. Hegel 1976a, S. 288; Hegel 1976b, S. 190; Hegel 1970b, S. 52).

18) Language and logos are associated with Hegel’s religious representations (vgl. Hegel 1971b, S. 373 ff.). Nakano describes the importance of the relation between Hegel’s philosophy and the beginning of John’s Gospel (Nakano 1979, Chapter 2 of Part 2).

When we sensuously feel the object, we are united with the object in an unmediated manner. However, when we give a name to the object, the object becomes “spiritual [*ein Geistiges*]” and of the “ego” (Hegel 1976b, S. 190).

He (= the spirit) says to the donkey, you are an inner thing and this inner thing is me - and your being is a tone that I invented at will [*er (=der Geist) sagt zum Esel, du bist ein inneres und dies Innre ist Ich – und dein Sein ist ein Ton, den ich willkürlich erfunden*]. (Hegel 1976b, S. 190)

In this sense, the name is “the ‘I’ that has become the object [*das zum Gegenstande gewordne Ich*]” (Hegel 1976b, S. 196). However, as long as the name is “the name of the individual thing [*der Namen des einzelnen Dinges*]” (Hegel 1976a, S. 289; vgl. Hegel 1976b, S. 196) which considers the sensuous individual as something ideal, it is still “a single ideality [*eine einzelne Idealität*]” (Hegel 1976a, S. 290). A name originally distinguishes things and “expresses the concrete, certain. [*drücken das concrete, bestimmte aus*]” (Hegel 1976a, S. 289).¹⁹⁾ Therefore, a name is said to be caught by the present, individual object.

The free connection and development of ideals is guaranteed when a name is freed from the individual object and placed in a relationship with other names; that is, names must become “Logos [*λογος*]” (Hegel 1976b, S. 190). In this way, “totality of the ideal [*Totalität des Idealen*]” (Hegel 1976a, S. 297) is given by language as Logos. Language is “the relationship of names [*die Beziehung der Namen*]” (Hegel 1976a, S. 289) and the whole nature is sublated in language to “ideally set nature [*ideell gesetzte Natur*]” (Hegel 1976a, S.318). Here, “I” and nature are truly united and humans’ “ideal domination against nature [*ideale Herrschaft gegen die Natur*]” (Hegel 1976a, S. 281) is realized.

Hegel summarizes this as follows:

Logos is reason, essence of thing and speech, thing and discourse, category [*λογος [ist] Vernunft Wesen des Dings und Rede, Sache und Sage, Kategorie*]. (Hegel 1976b, S. 190)

Fetcher says:

God’s ‘Word’ ... becomes the enabling basis of human speech and understanding and this latter is basically only a derived repetition of his eternal creation. It was therefore not by chance that when Hegel mentioned language as the ‘eponymous force,’ he spoke of the creative activity of man. [*Gottes “Wort” ... wird zur ermöglichenden Grundlage menschlichen Sprechens und Vernehmens und dieses letztere ist im Grunde nur eine abgeleitete Wiedeholung seiner ewigen Schöpfung. Es war daher auch nicht zufällig, daß Hegel bei Erwähnung der Sprache als “namengebende Kraft” von der Schöpfertätigkeit des Menschen sprach*] (Fetscher 1970, S. 174).

19) It is well known that Plato also considers “name” as a “tool to divide” (see Plato 1997, pp. 106–107).

We have briefly discussed the three properties that Hegel believes language contains: sign, name, and logos. Therefore, humans can position the object as their opponent and then sublimate this contradiction. Language which places the contradiction against the object is “consciousness,” and language which sublimes this contradiction is the “mediator.” Thus, Hegel calls language “consciousness as [a] mediator [*Bewußtsein als Mitte*]” (Hegel 1976a, S. 277).

We can say “consciousness simultaneously *distinguishes* itself from something, and at the same time *relates* itself to it” (Hegel 1977a, p. 52) when considering language. Consciousness finds its existence in language as Logos and “organizes itself in language to the totality of the ideal [*sich in der Sprache zur Totalität des idealen organisiert*]” (Hegel 1976a, S. 297).²⁰ In this sense, language is “the existing notion of consciousness [*der existierende Begriff des Bewußtsein*]” (Hegel 1976a, S. 288).

6. Interpreting *The Phrenology* in *Phenomenology of Spirit* per Hegel’s View of Language

Phenomenology of Spirit or “the experimental study of consciousness” describes the process by which consciousness makes itself the whole.

Hegel’s thesis that nature is sublated in language as the whole of ideals is summarized in *The Phrenology* [*Schädellehre*] in *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

As is widely known, reason, which has “the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality” (Hegel 1977a, p. 146), turns to the observation of nature to enhance its certainty of the truth, finds itself in the skull, and expresses via “infinite judgment” that “the existence of spirit is a thing” (see Hegel 1977a, pp. 480–481).²¹

Here, Hegel points out the contradiction between what the experiencing consciousness (=observing consciousness) thinks and what it expresses in language. Language always refutes the preconception of consciousness.

When in other respects it is said of Spirit that it *is*, that it has *being*, is a *Thing*, a single, separate *reality*, this is not *intended* to mean that it is something we can see or take in our hands or touch, and so on, but that is what is *said*. (Hegel 1977a, p. 208; see Hegel 1977a, pp. 480–481)

“Spirit . . . is a thing” (Hegel 1977a, p. 208) from a personal viewpoint (=standpoint of

20) When Hegel calls language the totality of the ideal, it does not mean that language is only the collection [*Aggregate*] of individual ideas as names (Hegel), but it is, as Bodammer points out, “an organic whole intellectually and reasonably integrated within itself [*ein ... verständig und vernünftig in sich geliedertes organisches Ganzes*]” (Bodammer 1969, S. 71).

21) Infinite judgement is explained in Chapter 7, section 1 of Ohta (2018).

representation) meaning that spirit is “non-spiritual” (Hegel 1977a, p. 481) and articulates the contradiction between spirit and thing. However, from the standpoint of “we” (=standpoint of notion), it expresses that spirit is “the most richly spiritual” (Hegel 1977a, p. 481) and “the unity of ‘I and being” (Hegel 1977a, p. 208).

Therefore, the unity of “I” and nature is expressed in language in the form of the infinite judgment that “spirit is a thing.” In this sense, language is “ideally posited nature [*ideell gesetzte Natur*]” (Hegel 1976a, S. 318) and “the second nature” within nature.²²⁾

7. From the Existence of Consciousness to the Existence of Spirit

Thus far, we have discussed language as the existence of consciousness which mediates the subject and the object (nature). However, we must also investigate language as the existence of self-consciousness which mediates the subject and other subjects. In addition, language can mediate the subject and the object, as a spiritual existence which mediates the subjects.

Signs and names indicate something objective. However, such acts postulate the communality among consciousnesses (subjects) and possess meaning. Language is an element of a community. Hegel says:

language is only as the language of a people . . . language is the ideal existence of the spirit only as the work of a people . . . it is a general, in itself recognized, in the consciousness of all reverberating in the same way; every speaking consciousness immediately becomes another consciousness [*die Sprache ist nur als Sprache eines Volks . . . Nur als Werk eines Volks ist die Sprache die ideale Existenz des Geistes . . . sie ist ein allgemeines an sich anerkanntes im Bewußtsein aller auf dieselbe Weise wiederhallendes; jedes sprechende Bewußtsein wird unmittelbar darin zu einem andern Bewußtsein*]. (Hegel 1976a, S. 318)

Language, which mediates self-consciousness with other self-consciousnesses, shows its original figure as the existence of spirit in the form of for-other-being. In *Jenaer Systementwürfe*, both language and labor are thought to be the mediators of the subject and object (vgl. Habermas 1968, S. 32 f.). Hegel further believes that on the level of realistic spirit, language as the mediator among humans has the foundation of its existence in the communality of humans.²³⁾

22) According to Hegel, language enables “the imaginary domination on nature” and labor enables “the real domination on nature” (vgl. Hegel 1976a, S.281). As Löwith points out, language and labor are “original modes of existence [*ursprüngliche Existenzweisen*]” of the spirit and “negative mode of behaviors [*negative Verhaltensweisen*]” against nature (Löwith 1981, S. 382).

23) Hegel says, “language is the highest power among humans [*die Sprache ist die höchste Macht unter den Menschen*]” (Hegel 1970b, S. 52).

This thought that language has a substantial foundation in communality is inherited in *Phenomenology of Spirit* and further developed as the history of spirit.

8. The History of Language as the Existence of Spirit

It is no exaggeration to say that in “Chapter A. Consciousness” of *Phenomenology of Spirit*, “the history of the Spirit was embodied and translated into the history of language. [*L'évolution de l'Esprit s'incarnait et se traduisait dans l'évolution de la langue.*]” as Koyré says (Koyré 1981, p. 200). In the chapter, Hegel describes the process of becoming “I.” The simple “I” consisted of the immediate connection of the individual and the whole (=state) in the ethical society of ancient Greece. The dismantled individual integrated and dominated both superficially and formally by laws in ancient Rome. The modern individual “universal self” (Hegel 1977a, p. 296) is originally the individual, but tries to make itself the whole by the mediation of self-making. Hegel describes this process using the history of language as the existence of “I.” The process of the spirit as self-making is described in the chapter as the historical actualization of spirit by language. This process is also the actualization of human communality by language, which will be briefly explained in the chapter on Spirit.

First, in the ethical world of ancient Greece, “self” is the “simple self” and is unified with “government [*Regierung*]” as “ethical substance” unmediated (Hegel 1977a, pp. 272, 285–286). Therefore, language which expresses the ethical world is the “law and command [*Gesetz und Befehl*]” (Hegel 1977a, p. 308; see Hegel 1977a, pp. 214–215, 395–396). The self has its existence in the “universal language” of ethics, such as “law,” “command,” and “customs” (Hegel 1977a, p. 213). In the “universal language,” “self” is only “the unreal shadow” (Hegel 1977a, p. 282; see Hegel 1977a, p. 270) that buries its being-for-self (autonomous existence) in the ethical subsistence.

“Action [*Tun*]” (Hegel 1977a, p.236) destroys the ethical “self” and makes “self” “have the value of selves and substances, possessing a separate being-for-self” (Hegel 1977a, p. 290). According to Hegel:

Action is in its own self its truth and reality, and individuality in its setting-forth or expression is, in relation to action, the End in and for itself. (Hegel 1977a, p. 236)

Language could express the individual itself for the first time in the modern era. *Phenomenology of Spirit* delineates modern society as a world of self-estranging spirits (=self-building) in which the self duplicates. In this world, the “simple self,” which was buried in the ethical substance of ancient people, separates itself and becomes self-consciousness and substance (=government power and property), that is, the dualistic self. Here, the self expresses itself in the form of separation. The mediation of the self’s dualistic estrangement makes it possible for the self to obtain the substance.

This process is called the world of education and culture, which is described in *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Language is the existence of the unification of the dualistically separated self, and is “the middle term” (Hegel 1977a, pp. 306, 317) which gives self-consciousness (=self) universality and individualizes the substance.

Hegel describes the historical process, beginning with the feudal system through the monarchy to modern civil society, as the development of the alienation (=estrangement) of the self-consciousness, and describes it as the development of language. Language, which represents the first step (the feudal system), is “*counsel [Rat]*” (Hegel 1977a, p. 307). The vassals who live in the feudal system have no wish to live independently as individuals but are “the *haughty* vassals” (Hegel 1977a, p. 307) who commit to the community beyond themselves. However, counsels representing the community are not disinterested but include private interest which they themselves do not notice. Therefore, counsel is not the word which externalizes the contents of the self-consciousness completely. Counsel, “in spite of its chatter about the *general* good, reserves to itself what suits its *own* best interest, and is inclined to make this chatter about the general good a substitute for action” (Hegel 1977a, p. 307). Hegel considers that the externalization (=universalization) of the self-consciousness and internalization (=individualization) of the substance (=government) are concurrent.

Therefore, if “counsel” does not make self-consciousness externalize its contents, the subjectification of government is also prevented. According to Hegel, counsel is “not yet Spirit that completely knows and expresses [*ausspricht*] itself” (Hegel 1977a, p. 310). The feudal system in Germany divided the country into many territories and made it difficult to establish territories under the will of one nation. Hegel explains the relationship between each territory and its vassals using the word “counsel.”

Conversely, absolutism was established in France. Under absolutism, the state appears as the subject of its concrete will, as King Louis XIV says, “I am the state [*L'État, c'est moi*].” The relationship between self-consciousness (individual) and the state turns into the relationship between vassals and the king. The vassals use “the language of their praise [*die Sprache der Schmeicherei*]” (Hegel 1977a, S. 311) to speak to their king. The vassals praise their king to make him the leader of the state; the state (=substance) becomes the self (=subject), and the self achieves universal power.

“The language of flattery” turns the government “into a power that is explicit with an existence of its own, [and] makes it into a self-conscious individuality” (Hegel 1977a, p. 310). “The language of flattery” prompts self-consciousness to renounce its “own *inner certainty*” (Hegel 1977a, p. 311) and heightens the government to self-consciousness. However, in this case, the individuality of the government which excludes other self-consciousnesses is not the self of the self-consciousness, and the self of the government becomes the “*being-for-itself*” (Hegel 1977a, p. 315), confronting other self-consciousnesses. This is the reason Hegel says that “the language of flattery” is “Spirit that is

still one-sided" (Hegel 1977a, p. 315).

Both counsel and the language of flattery are existences which mediate the separated self, but these existences cannot truly unite two selves: self-consciousness and substance. They are one-sided spirits, making only one of them positive and existent.

Conversely, "the language of this disrupted consciousness [*die Sprache der Zerrissenheit*]" (Hegel 1977a, p. 316) expresses "the 'I,' this *pure* 'I'" (Hegel 1977a, p. 308) completely. "The language of this disrupted consciousness" would be the phrase that expresses modern civil society based on its deepest substance. Modern civil society plays a central role in the process of self-consciousness changing its object from state to property. Modern civil society is, according to Hegel, one that is filled with contradictions. In this society, selfish individuals prescribed by property confront each other but are concurrently totally interdependent. Further, Hegel says modern civil society is a unique world in which self-consciousness (human) and things (property) become one another by mutual mediation.

"The language of this disrupted consciousness" is the existence of self-consciousness, which exists in "the universal talk and destructive judgment" (Hegel 1977a, p. 317). In this language, "I" has its objects in others, but these objects are immediately sublated into "I." Here, "what is for the 'I' an 'other' is only the 'I' itself" (Hegel 1977a, p. 327). Therefore, the judgment by "the language of this disrupted consciousness" is the "infinite judgment [*das unendliche Urteil*]" (Hegel 1977a, pp. 316, 327) which sublates the dualistic "I" to "pure I" without mediation. Self-consciousness as pure individuality heightens itself immediately to universality. This language expresses "the absolute perversion" (Hegel 1977a, p. 317) and is the truth of the modern civil society (=the world of culture) as a whole and "the existence of spirit [*die Existenz des Geistes*]" (Hegel 1977a, p. 316).

9. From "the language of disrupted consciousness" to "the language of conscience"

Language as "the language of disrupted consciousness" culminates in its distinctive character. We have discussed that the history of culture has its roots in language. The history of culture is nothing but the process by which self-consciousness negates all substantial opposition toward itself and develops into the individual, pure self. This individualization process of self-consciousness is concurrently its universalization process. Language is the existence of spirit which mediates these two processes and unites them. Hegel says, "in speech, self-consciousness, *qua independent separate individuality*, comes as such into existence, so that it exists for others" (Hegel 1977a, p. 308). The more "I" becomes individualized, the more language as the existence of "I" becomes the universal mediator.²⁴⁾ Hegel explains that the individualization process of "I" is parallel to the universalization process of language and says:

24) I owe this interpretation to Inaba. He understands the relation between the mode of the modern

The 'I' is this particular 'I' — but equally the *universal* 'I'; its manifesting is also at once the externalization and vanishing of *this* particular 'I,' and as a result the 'I' remains in its universality. The 'I' that utter itself is *heard* or *perceived*; it is an infection in which it has immediately passed into unity with those for whom it is a real existence, and is a universal self-consciousness. (Hegel 1977a, pp. 308–309)

The above citation summarizes Hegel's view on language concisely. Language becomes the existence of the universal "I" by its being "this" "I"'s existence because the individual "I" can be heard completely only in language. "I"'s expression [*Aussprechen*] and the listen-in [*Vernehmen*] are both the same process of externalization of "I."²⁵ It is both the separation and unification processes of "I."

Hegel finds the true unification of dualistic "I" in the language of conscience [*die Sprache des Gewissens*]. The language of conscience is the existence of "the spirit that has returned into itself, is certain of itself" (Hegel 1977a, pp. 395–396). "The language of this disrupted consciousness" does not have this self-certainty (=self-recognition) of the conscience. "The language of this disrupted consciousness" is the "nihilistic game which it plays with itself" (Hegel 1977a, p. 317) which upsets both "this I" and the "universal I." Therefore, the return to itself is impossible.

"The language of consciousness" is the element which recognizes both "I" and others and makes itself truly certain. This language places the self-certainty of self-consciousness into universality.

The content which language has here acquired is no longer the perverted, and perverting and distracted, self of the world of culture; on the contrary, it is the Spirit that has returned into itself, is certain of itself, and certain in itself of its truth, or of its own recognition [of that truth], and which is acknowledged as knowing it. (Hegel 1977a, pp. 395–396)

self-consciousness and the language properly and says, "In modern society, self-consciousness becomes the individuality of self-consciousness that exists for itself [die für sich seiende Einzelheit des Selbstbewußtseins], but when that tendency becomes stronger, the language in which self-consciousness has its existence, on the contrary, becomes more circulatable and universal inevitably. These contradictory tendencies are fundamentally tied together, and the modern world is such a place." (Inaba 1977, p. 186).

25) As is well-known, "listen-in [*Vernehmen*]" from Hegel means listening to the words of God (logos) and is equivalent to reason (see Translator's note to Hegel 1973 (Japanese Literature), p. 465). "Listen-in [*Vernehmen*]" mediates the integration of the split "self." It enables the dialogue of self with itself (thinking) and the dialogue of the self with others. Reason is nothing but to listen to its own externalization (vgl. Hegel 1976b, S. 190). This is, for Hegel, to listen to the words of God (externalization). See the usage of "*vernehmen* (listen-in)" in *Phenomenology of Spirit*: perceptible [*vernehmlich*], perceived or heard [*vernommen*], perceived [*vernommen*], heard [*vernommen*], and heard [*vernommen*] (Hegel 1977a, pp. 190, 309, 395, 430, 465).

Here, language gains its most profound meaning. Self-consciousness listens to itself and is listened to by others, which makes self-consciousness recognize itself and others. Language realizes mutual recognition and is the profound element of the absolute spirit (see Hegel 1977a, pp. 407–408).

We have discussed language as the existence of the becoming of “I.” According to Hegel, “I” is “just this inner being which is reflected into itself and which is immediately present and is the self-certainty of the self for which it is present” (Hegel 1977a, p. 460). We found the existence of such “I” in the language of conscience. The development outlined in *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the movement of spirit which begins with this “I” as the individual self in the sensuous certainty, develops through language (i.e., the existence of spirit), and finally becomes the universal self.

According to Hegel, language initially “posits what is inward as what is [*setzt Innerliches als seiendes*]” (Hegel 1976b, S. 189). Self (“I”) posits its interior in the elements of beings, sublates the immediacy of the object, and posits the object in the relationship with the self. The externalization of the self and the internalization of the object are concurrent in language. Therefore, according to Hegel, language is “the perfect element in which inwardness is just as external as externality is inward” (Hegel 1977a, p. 439). In this way, the objects are posited as another self which opposes the self. This dualism of self is the substantial process of the movement of spirit. It is the process by which the self as the reflected self or for-itself-being appears. Hegel’s “notion” refers to the “for-itself-being” of self in which the element of language lives.

The process of becoming the for-itself-being of self is concurrently the process of the self’s realizing its for-other-being, because as the “self” becomes independent, language as the existence of “self” more clearly appears as a communal characteristic. Language as the existence of consciousness makes itself dualistic within nature. Then, as the existence of self-consciousness, language makes itself dualistic in others. This process of becoming dualistic is also the process of unification. Language is the “unity of two free selves [*Einheit zweier freier Selbst*]” (Hegel 1976b, S. 189), that is, the existence of spirit.

Afterword by the Translator

Kohtaro Ohta (b. 1947) is an emeritus professor at Hiroshima University of Economics (Hiroshima, Japan). He published *Hegel no Baikai Shiso* [Hegel on Mediation] (Ohta 2018), and I have translated Chapter 9 of his book here.

Philosophical textbooks for beginners often refer to Hegel’s dialectic as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. However, nowhere in Hegel’s texts can we find such a simple scheme. If you dare to look for something in three stages, it would be an-sich, für-sich, and an-und für-sich. However, this can be said to be three different appearances of the same one being and changing the appearance of one being is the core of the dialectic.

Described in this way, Hegel’s logic appears to be mysterious and significantly different from ordinary logic and mathematical logic, but in reality, the ordinary logical framework is helpful to

understand Hegel's logic.

In logic and mathematics, we learn an axiomatic system consisting of axioms and derivation rules. Some propositions are selected from a set of propositions as axioms, which are usually the simplest propositions and the necessary minimum. All propositions in the set are organized to the axiomatic system, that is, all propositions except for axioms are deduced based on the derivation rules. The theoretical system will be constructed in this way. In theory, any proposition can be selected as an axiom, and the proof connects all the propositions to form a system.

The phenomena of the spirit are such that the first immediate existence takes its forms from the senses via understanding, self-consciousness, and reason to absolute knowledge. The most important concepts in the development of the spirit are consciousness (sense, perception, understanding), self-consciousness, observational (theoretical) and behavioral (practical) reasoning, as well as the moral, educated, ethical, and religious spirits. The concepts in the development of the spirit initially presented as chaos are clarified as necessary and point to the final destination—absolute knowledge.

Phenomenology of Spirit describes the entire process through which the consciousness has varied experiences en route to the final goal—absolute knowledge. Thus, *Phenomenology of Spirit* brings the various phenomena of the spirit into a scientific order according to their necessity.

The derivation rule in this system is dialectic, and Ohta argues that it is closely related to language. Hegel defines language as “the existence of spirit.” Considering that, we presume that language has an intimate relationship with spirit, which is one of the key concepts of Hegel's philosophy.

Language externalizes the self-consciousness and internalizes the sensuous. The sensuous must be sublated in language and become the universal self-consciousness because the universal exists in the sensuous, and language brings the universal to the surface. To reject the universal and limit oneself to the individual and the immediate is to become “the anti-human” because it rejects agreement with others and is against the communality that belongs to human substance.

When it comes to thought and language, according to Hegel, both are the power of spirit which sublimate the immediate and show the substance of the objects. Language and thought are, therefore, mutually inseparable and “the forms of thought are initially shown and laid down in human language.” Humans describe the substance of things with language energized by thought, and thought can be thought in the original sense only when it is composed in language.

The core of Hegel's philosophy is to grasp the Absolute as the process of “its own becoming” and express it in language. Language is what realizes and mediates this movement. Hegel was certain that language can and must express this movement of the Spirit completely and was proud of the uniqueness of his philosophy because of this certainty.

This chapter is based on Ohta's master's thesis which is the starting point of his research. Some researchers of Hegel seem to overly associate Hegel's dialectic with Christianity. Thanks to Ohta's

point of view, however, Hegel's true intentions could be elucidated. Thus, this paper is as important as Ohta's previous works (Ohta 2021; Ohta 2022) in understanding Hegel's vision.

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