

Lecture

# Community Policing in Japan and Hungary: A Comparative Analysis

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## Introduction

This article aims to describe and compare the state of public security in Japan and Hungary and, in connection with this, the policing models of the two countries. In the case of Japan, I rely on government documents to show how the community orientation of the police has become increasingly dominant, and I also describe the *kōban* policing model. Furthermore, drawing on my research in Japan in the autumn of 2022, I also discuss the challenges facing the *kōban* police today. In addition to outlining the legal framework supporting community-oriented policing in Hungary, I present two relevant successful programmes as well. As I will point out, however, community policing has not been institutionalised in Hungary. Another important difference between the two countries is that while in Japan the work of community police is strongly supported by the so-called *bōhan* organisations, in Hungary no such form of cooperation has developed. At the end of the paper, I emphasise that further research is needed to inves-

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tigate the relationship between different policing models and the subjective perceptions of safety.

### **Public safety in Hungary and Japan**

There are significant differences between Japan and Hungary with respect to their geographies, societies, cultures and the current challenges facing the two countries. These differences include the following. Japan has a population nearly ten times that of Hungary (Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2022; Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2022a). Japan is bordered by the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean, while Hungary is a landlocked country. The two countries face very different geopolitical challenges. Japan has a much higher GDP per capita than Hungary (OECD, 2022). The religious map of the two countries is very different: in contrast to Hungary, the number of Christians in Japan is small, with the majority of the population being Shinto and Buddhist (Kavanaugh & Jong, 2020). Compared to Hungary, Japan's society is considered more collectivist (Braithwaite, 1989; Fukushima, Sharp & Kobayashi, 2009; Hidasi, 2007; Kobayashi & Farrington 2020; Liu 2016, Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Purebl, 2020). This assessment is widely accepted even though several researchers and research findings have highlighted societal changes in Japan, such as the rise of individualism (Matsumoto, 2002; Norasakkunkit & Uchida 2019; Takano & Osaka, 2018; Takano & Sogon 2008), the erosion of traditional gender roles (Rodríguez-Planas & Tanaka 2021; Shambaugh, Nunn & Portman, 2017) and interpersonal relationships (CR Factory, 2017). Some have even warned that the description of Japan as a collectivist society is misleading and overgeneralising (Croydon 2016; Dollinger, Osa-

wa & Schirmer 2022; Takano & Osaka 1997). Despite these claims, Japanese society can be considered more collectivist, while Hungarian society is more individualistic (Fülöp et al, 2019; Fülöp, 2006; Holicza 2016).

It is particularly relevant to highlight here the differences between the two countries in connection with public safety. Japan is considered one of the safest countries in the world. It has one of the lowest victimization rates worldwide, a statement that stayed true even in the year when Japan recorded the highest number of crimes in the period after World War II (OECD, 2009: 125; Ellis, Lewis, Hamai & Williamson, 2008: 176). In 2020, the number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants was only 0.25, while the respective figure in the United States was 6.52 in the same year (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2022). The table below shows data that allow comparison with Hungary.

	<b>Japan</b>	<b>Hungary</b>
Total number of crimes in 2021 (National Police Agency, 2021; Office of the Attorney General, 2022)	914.920	154.012
Number of crimes per 100.000 people in 2021 (National Police Agency, 2021; Office of the Attorney General, 2022)	729	1.583
Number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2020 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2022)	0,25	0,83
Number of robberies per 100,000 inhabitants (National Police Agency, 2021; Attorney General's Office, 2022)	1,1	5,6
Number of thefts per 100,000 inhabitants (National Police Agency, 2021; Attorney General's Office, 2022)	332	420

Number of prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants (Fair & Walmsley, 2021; Hungarian Prison Service Headquarters, 2021)	36	192
Number of police officers per capita (Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2022; Eurostat, 2022)	374	384

As the above data show, Japan's public safety record is very good. In comparison, in Hungary, the number of crimes per 100,000 people is nearly twice as high as in Japan, while the number of homicides is approximately three times higher. The difference is more striking in the case of robberies: the respective figure in Hungary is five times as high as in Japan. The difference is not as significant for theft, but it is still notable: Japan has 332 recorded thefts per 100,000 inhabitants, compared to Hungary's 420. In terms of the prison population, the difference is again substantial: the number of prison inmates (per 100,000 inhabitants) is approximately six times higher in Hungary than in Japan. The above differences can be observed despite the fact that the number of police officers per capita is almost the same; 373 in Japan and 384 in Hungary. It is therefore appropriate to present the policing models specific to the two countries.

### **The Japanese community policing model**

In Japan, the community orientation of the police is enshrined in several policy and strategy documents. Through these documents we can trace how the community policing approach has become increasingly dominant over the years. The 2003 *Action Plan to Create a Crime-Resistant Society* (Ministerial Meeting Concerning Measures Against Crime) did not yet use the terms

community police or community policing. However, in connection with crime reduction, it used the *Broken Window* theory as a reference point (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), which laid down the foundations of the community policing model. The 2005 document, *Japanese Community Police and the Police Box System*, (National Police Academy of Japan) demonstrates community orientation in its very title. It states that the tasks of community policemen include

- engaging, as part of the local community, in activities that are closely related to the daily life and safety of residents;
- informing the local community about the presence of the police, and supporting self-defence and crime prevention activities organised by residents;
- responding first to emergency calls.

A report published by the Japanese police in 2021 already dedicated a separate chapter to community policing (National Police Agency: 13). It describes community policemen as maintaining close contact with citizens in the community through their constant and visible presence, patrolling and regular visits to households.

Several studies on policing and criminology conducted in the past decades already provided detailed descriptions of community policing (Aldous and Leishman, 2000; Finch, 1999; Kawamura & Shirakawa, 2008; Moriyama, 1993; Yoshida and Leishman 2006; Young, 2022, 2019). The key element of the Japanese community policing model is the *kōban*, which is found mostly in urban settings, and the *chuzaisho*, which is available mainly in rural settlements. Their buildings are usually located at busy locations, intersections, and transport hubs. A *kōban*, which is under the ju-

jurisdiction of the local police station, typically has 3–5 officers, while a *chuzai* usually has one community policeman available to residents 24 hours a day. The design of the buildings also helps to create a sense of accessibility, as passers-by can see the building from the outside thanks to their large windows and glazed (and usually open) doors, and the police officers themselves often stand in front of the building while performing their duties.

The nearly 6,300 *kōban* and 6,200 *chuzai* community policemen have a wide range of tasks: patrolling, directing traffic, showing the way for pedestrians, recording reports or taking in lost property. When a call for help is made to the central emergency number, the dispatcher always notifies the police officer of the *kōban* or *chuzai* nearest to the location of the call, ensuring a faster response. Counselling is also part of the duties, where residents can share not only crime prevention and crime-related issues, but also personal and family problems with community police officers. Crime prevention in close cooperation with local actors is also a priority (the details of which will be discussed in the next section). In sum, the *kōban* system is not only a physical structure, but also embodies a policing philosophy. Its explicit aim is to physically extend policing and thereby strengthen the relationship between local communities and the police.

In autumn 2022, I had the opportunity to do fieldwork in Japan,<sup>1)</sup> in the cities of Tokyo and Kyoto. I conducted a total of ten

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interviews with police officers and National Police Agency staff, but I also met criminologists, lawyers and prosecutors. I also visited several *kōbans* and participated in a crime prevention programme involving local associations, schools and young people. The fieldwork enabled me not only to give a general description of the system but also to report on the challenges faced by *kōban* community police officers today.

Above all, we should mention the change in the structure of Japanese society. Parker (1984), conducting research on policing several decades ago, was already confronted with the fact that the erosion of interpersonal relations was making it increasingly difficult for the police to cooperate with local communities. Reports by the Japanese Police Research Centre came to a similar conclusion (Yasuda, 2011; National Police Agency, 2021). They suggest that, until the 1980s, community solidarity and citizens' sense of social norms played an important role in maintaining public safety. However, due to societal changes, this crime prevention potential is no longer as strong. The same view was put forward by researchers who studied the relationship between the police and local communities (Aldous and Leishman, 2000; Brogden and Nijhar, 2005; Ellis et al., 2008; Fenwick, 2004; Yoshida and Leishman, 2006). Moreover, these difficulties were also highlighted by the interviewees I spoke to during my fieldwork. In their view, crime prevention work has become more difficult with urbanisation and increased spatial mobility, as well as the weakening of local communities. This type of difficulty can be noted during the

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Service (Hungary) where I had the opportunity to deepen my knowledge about policing for many years.

preparation and implementation of household visits by community policemen.

As I mentioned earlier, community police officers are responsible for visiting households in the area at least once a year. The purpose of these meetings (Brogden, 1999; Kawamura & Shirakawa, 2008; National Police Agency, 2021) is to provide crime prevention advice and seek suggestions for improvements in police work and to listen to related complaints from the public. Community police officers also collect information, for example on family composition or who to contact in case of an emergency. However, according to my interviewees, members of households are less and less welcoming towards the visiting community police officers. Many feel that a visit from the police is an invasion of their privacy. This aversion may explain why citizens had been dissatisfied with the police already several years ago (Leishman, 2007).

The community police's operational model itself presents a further challenge. If the police officers on duty are on patrol or visiting a crime scene following an emergency call, there is no one to help residents visiting the *kōban*. This is not a new phenomenon: Yoshida experienced this deficiency during his fieldwork in 2002–2003 (Yoshida and Leishman, 2006) and a 2004 National Police Agency survey also found that 56% of respondents had experienced such a problem (Kawamura & Shirakawa, 2008: 165), which explains why 39% of respondents at the time were dissatisfied with the work of local police officers referring to an empty *kōban* (Leishman, 2007, 199). Addressing this, in a speech in 2004, the Prime Minister urged that an end be put to this situation (Hamai & Ellis, 2006). Subsequently, the number of commu-

nity police officers increased, but even today it happens that people who need help still do not know where to turn (The Asahi Simbun, 2020).

Finally, it is worth highlighting a view that the unique *kōban* buildings may pose a security risk to those serving in them. In recent years, there have been several attempts to seize the weapons of community police officers (Japan Today, 2022; The Asahi Simbun, 2019), some of which ended in fatalities (Japan Today, 2018a; 2018b). My interviewees, however, stressed that the necessary security measures have already been taken by the Japanese police to avoid similar incidents.

Some of the early research in criminology and policing, focusing on the Japanese policing model, attributed Japan's excellent public safety indicators to the *kōban* system (Ames, 1981; Bayley, 1991; Braithwaite, 1989, Clifford, 1978; Haley, 1992; Parker, 1984). Other researchers disagreed with this explanation (Brogden 1999; Miyazawa, 1990, Leishman, 2007), while others expressed outright criticism of the *kōban* system (Miyazawa, 1992; Aldous & Leishman, 2000; Ellis et al, 2008a; Baradel 2021). According to Yoshida (2006, 2008, 2010) and Yoshida & Leishman (2006), it would be even a mistake to characterize Japan as a country with well-developed community policing because of some specific characteristics of the koban police officers (e.g. low morals, rude behaviour towards the citizens, cynicism and isolation from society). In this article, I will refrain from discussing this debate in detail. However, it is worth noting that the supposed success of the *kōban* community policing has led to the adoption of the model in several countries and regions, including Brazil, Central America, some cities in Germany, India, Malaysia, the Philip-

pires, Singapore and some US states (Bayley, 1991; Brogden & Nijhar 2005; Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2022a; Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2022b; Kocak, 2018; Kocak, 2019; Martin, 2011; Singh, 2000).

### **Community policing in Hungary**

As in Japan, Hungary has a legal framework that promotes the principles and philosophy of community policing. In connection with decentralised and community-focused policing, we should mention the National Crime Prevention Strategy (Government Resolution 1744/2013) in force now. According to the Strategy, the police will respond to community problems in cooperation with the community and the bodies representing the community (Chapter 3.2). It also stresses that public safety in a municipality can be achieved effectively through local cooperation and that the state and local civil society organisations must work together to reduce crime (Chapter 8.1).

Similar principles are set out in Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police, which states that the police, when performing their duties, shall cooperate with state and local government bodies, civil society and business organisations, citizens and their communities. In addition, the police support voluntary activities of local authorities and citizens' associations aimed at improving public safety (§ 2).

The approach of community policing is most evident in the District Commissioner Regulations (National Police Headquarters' Instruction 26/2015). The aim of the regulations is to enable the district officers to carry out their work effectively in order to protect public order and public safety and to improve people's

subjective perception of safety. According to point 2 of the document, the main objective of the district commissioner service is *“to establish and maintain permanent, direct contact between the Police and the population, the municipalities, local residents, civil and business organisations in the settlements within the district”*. According to the Regulations, district officers are required to familiarise themselves with the area of their deployment (including the traditions of the population, the relations between members of the population and the factors affecting their living conditions) (point 45). When invited to attend local events, they must wear their uniforms (village meetings, council meetings, citizens' forums) which may strengthen their links with the population and the local authorities (point 49). The district officer is responsible for crime prevention in his/her area of activity, during which he/she is in constant contact with the crime prevention adviser or coordinator at the police station and with local actors in the field of social crime prevention (point 69). In particular, the district officer is tasked (among other things) with the implementation of legislation on the protection of children and minors, cooperates with parents and various child protection institutions and monitors deviant groups of young people, and takes measures to prevent offences. He/she also contributes to the dissemination of information on crime prevention and participates in the promotion of the various police youth protection school programmes (point 70).

Several innovative and successful good practices can be identified, pointing to the presence of community policing in Hungary. Among these, I would like to highlight two programmes in the context of this article:

1. The *Swiss-Hungarian Co-operation Programme on Community* was implemented in four cities in Hungary between 2012 and 2016 (Bezerédi, 2022; Christián, 2019; Finszter, 2018; Ministry of Interior, 2022; National Police Headquarters, 2015; National Police Headquarters, 2016). The implementation was divided into five phases. The preparation phase included the mapping and studying of community policing practices through study visits abroad and a review of literature from abroad. This is when a methodological handbook was prepared, to be used as teaching material for the training of community police officers in the future. The subsequent phase involved assuring the human and material resources necessary for the successful introduction of the new model, the training of community police officers and the preparation of police station communities. In the third phase, the community policing model itself was launched, followed by an evaluation of the experiences (following a one-year pilot period). The original plan was to introduce the model in 20 more cities. The aim was to develop closer cooperation between local actors involved in improving public safety. The programme's designers initially hoped that it would improve public safety and public perceptions of safety and, in the long run, create a knowledge base that would enable the replication of the model. However, eventually, the community policing model was not extended.
2. The joint policing project titled "*My Neighbour is a Policeman*" (National Police Headquarters, 2020;) was launched with the support of a Budapest district municipality. The

aim of the project was to develop personal relationships based on trust and safety between the residents of the neighbourhood and the local police officers. The municipality provided training, equipment and tools (e.g. bicycles, vehicles, mobile phones, number plate recognition equipment, defibrillators) to the district officers.

In order to promote the programme, the local media outlets published the contact details of the district police officers, together with a map to help district residents identify the officers in their area. These advertisements received a lot of positive feedback from residents and doubled the number of reports. Community police officers were often approached by local residents for help even when the matter was not within the police's remit (e.g. tree branch fell on the street, potholes were noticed in the road). This suggests that trust in police officers is improving. The fact that in 2018 the European Crime Prevention Network recognised the programme as a good practice (Dehbi, 2019: 59) is an indication of its success.

In summary, we can say that the legal background in Hungary recognises the principles of community policing and supports their practical implementation. In addition, good practices can be identified which are explicitly based on the philosophy and approach of community policing. In addition, feedback from the public was very positive in both pilot programmes. Nevertheless, community policing does not exist in an institutionalised form in Hungary. As Korinek (2015) and Berei (2018) note, in the 1990s there was a willingness on the part of both political leaders and

policy-makers to move towards community policing. Ultimately, such a change did not take place as there was no will on the part of the leadership to dismantle the centralised structure, consequently *“a reactive mode of operation came to the fore, while proactive activity and thinking connected to community policing no longer appeared among the strategic tasks”* (Berei, 2018: 27). Finszter also emphasises that there was no police reform in Hungary and community policing has not been accepted (2014: 261). He points out that the centralised Hungarian police model based on military principles was not suitable for integrating a decentralised approach anyway (ibid: 58). Finszter stresses that because of this operational model, the police *“are forced to concentrate most of their forces on centralised tasks, while losing local knowledge and contact with small communities that perceive a lack of local public safety”* (2018: 273). Another researcher on the topic, Christián (2016), also stresses that Hungarian policing is not open enough to innovative methods from abroad, such as community policing. It is also worth mentioning Vári’s 2017 research, which concluded that police officers themselves do not consider the police to be community-oriented; instead, they characterise it as an authoritarian organisation based on power and political control. The lack of openness to the community is also reflected in the fact that police officers do not consider communication with the public to be open, direct and two-way. The police officers who took part in the research described the police as rather closed and passive.

At the same time, on a case-by-case basis, police officers sometimes carry out their work at the local level in a way that meets the expectations of community policing. Budavári, for example, stresses that *“the community policing approach has not broken*

*through the walls of a highly hierarchical, centralised organisation, but has seeped into it*” (2022: 12). Berei also points out that, while *“in the district commissioner service there is some chance for the post holder to implement some of the elements of community policing. This, however, can only take shape locally, as individual initiatives, and some dedicated police officers provide an example for that”* (2018: 33). However the number of these officers – and the citizens they reach – is small. The results of the evaluation of the Swiss-Hungarian community policing programme presented earlier point to the same conclusion. As pointed out by Bezerédi (2022), the preparation and communication of the programme within the police force was not effective. Furthermore, only one community policeman were allocated to every 15,000 citizens in the districts established. There is no doubt that with such a high population number in the districts, the police officers were able to establish meaningful contact with only a small number of citizens, therefore the community orientation of the programme was necessarily pushed to the background.

### **Allies of the police in Japan and Hungary**

In the years leading up to the millennium, the number of recorded crimes in Japan started to increase. Although in the decades following World War II, the number of recorded cases had hovered between 1–1.5 million, by 2002 the figure had reached 2.85 million (Ministerial Meeting Concerning Measures Against Crime, 2003: 2). As Hamai & Ellis (2015, 2008a, 2008b, 2006) and Hamai (2013) underlined, this rise in cases was not entirely real as it could be (at least partly) explained by the changes in police data collection practices that resulted in recording minor offend-

es that had been previously not taken into consideration by police officers (while the number of several serious crimes, the damage caused by criminal incidents and even the risk of becoming a victim were actually decreased in this period). However, citizens' subjective perception of safety was deteriorating: the proportion of people who felt fear or anxiety about crime was 41% in 2002, compared with 26% in 1997 (ibid). The public discourse on crime intensified (Fenwick, 2004; Miyazawa, 2008), and the moral panic in society was further exacerbated by police corruption scandals and cases of misconduct that at times cost lives (Johnson 2002; Kanamaya, 2011; Oyamada 2019, Tsushima & Hamai 2015). Trust in the police deteriorated in these years, even in international comparison (Cao, Stack & Sun, 1998; Fenwick 2004; Hamai & Ellis, 2006, 2008a; Kobayashi, 2020).

The Japanese government decided to respond to these challenges by strengthening the relationship between the police and local communities, as well as boosting community solidarity. Thus, a series of guidelines and strategic plans (Ministerial Meeting Concerning Measures Against Crime, 2003; 2005; 2008) was developed, among others, to 1) raise awareness of crime prevention, 2) enable citizens to actively participate in activities aiming to improve public safety, and 3) create a social environment that is not conducive to crime. In line with these strategic objectives, the *bōhan* crime prevention organisations which have been present in the country since the beginning of the 20th century were strengthened. The range of these organisations has expanded, with new members joining crime prevention, road safety, teacher-parent and neighbourhood associations, youth support committees and organisations supporting cooperation between the police

and parents. The extent of the change is indicated by the 1227% increase in the number of volunteers involved in *bōhan* activities between 2003 and 2008, reaching 2.5 million by the latter year (National Police Agency, 2018). The increase continued thereafter; in 2016, the number of volunteers involved in crime prevention activities was close to 2.8 million (Herber, 2018: 2). The expansion is also reflected in the increasing number of *bōhan renrakushō* (Finch, 1999): these homes act as a kind of interface facilitating communication between the police and the public.

These local organisations thus strengthened perform a wide range of tasks. The majority of their volunteers patrol their neighbourhoods (National Police Agency, 2016) while others accompany children to school, distribute information materials, visit elderly residents or clean up public spaces (National Police Agency, 2018). They also cooperate with the police on organising crime prevention lectures and workshops, involving a wide range of target groups.

It is not clear how the development of the *bōhan* is causally related to changes in public safety indicators. However, crime statistics indicate positive developments in Japan in the years following the millennium. The number of crimes solved by community policemen increased (Ministry of Justice, 2021: 7), while the number of registered crimes decreased from 2.85 million in 2002 to 914,920 in 2020 (ibid: 3). It might be important to mention that several social and organisational factors (declining birth rate, ageing population, changing crime recording practices of the police etc.) contributed to the decreasing number of cases (Hamai & Ellis (2015, 2008a, 2008b, 2006; Hamai, 2013) that cannot be explained solely by the improving criminal situation. Yet, it can be

said that the government's intention to engage and activate the public in crime prevention has been successful. However, this required an increase in the number of community police officers (and retired policemen supporting them) in the *kōban*, strengthening the community orientation of the police, engaging and activating the local community, and forging collaboration between the actors involved (Ellis & Kyo, 2017; Herber 2018; Kanamaya, 2011; Schimhowsky, 2021).

The changes that took place in Hungary after the collapse of the state socialist system in 1989 were similar to those described above in the context of Japan. At that time the number of crimes started to skyrocket: while it remained below 200,000 until the democratic transition, by 1996 it had reached 600,621, its highest level since then (Kó, 2019). Describing this period, Vári puts it bluntly: *"The change of the regime was followed by the explosion of the 'crime bomb', which coincided with the inertia of previous law enforcement practices."* (2022: 7). It is also worth quoting Friedman at length here, who wrote the following about the difficulties after the regime change:

*With the transition evidenced in Hungary from 1990 and onward, it will take Hungary far less time to reach the crime level of the West if proper action is not taken in a timely fashion. The country is already evidencing an increase in property offenses and some unprecedented examples of violent behavior reminiscent of Western style crime. At the same time police have lost the strong grounds they had during the previous regime and now are judged by the services they provide and not by the power they exert. (1996: 123)*

As was mentioned earlier, there was momentum in this era to introduce a community policing model. What happened instead was the opposite with a more centralised police force emerging. In these years, therefore, the Japanese and the Hungarian police followed different paths with respect to shaping their structure and mission. As a result, community policemen in the Japanese *kōban* are nowadays working as members of the local community, with the effective support of *bōhan* organisations. In contrast, in Hungary, the police do not have such strong community ties, and their work is not supported by the extensive network that exists in Japan.

### Conclusions

I have pointed out in this article that the community policing model in Japan is a policing approach that has been adopted and supported by the government. The *kōban* system promotes (and requires) police officers to engage directly with members of the local community and to respond meaningfully to the problems and needs that arise. In addition to the government's commitment, the collectivist nature of Japanese society probably contributes to the prevalence of the *bōhan* activity – in its absence members of the community police would have a much harder job. In Hungary, the legal framework also supports cooperation between the police and the local communities and we can find several good practices that are based on the principles of community policing. Nevertheless, in Hungary community policing has not been institutionalised, nor can we speak about as close cooperation between crime prevention organisations and the police as in Japan, which is based on the involvement of local residents.

The Japanese model of policing is based on the cooperation between the police and the community, and thus necessarily on the involvement and activation of local residents. However, various research findings suggest that this approach is limited in its ability to enhance residents' subjective sense of security. As discussed earlier, the number of recorded crimes in Japan has been declining since the turn of the millennium; nevertheless, the proportion of people who felt unsafe on the streets after dark was still high during this period in global comparison (OECD, 2009: 125; Ellis et al., 2008: 177). Recent comparative research also pointed to a low perception of safety (National Police Agency, 2020; Hino, Ue-sugi, & Asami, 2018; Japan Times, 2022; Tomita, 2011).

Hungary, by contrast, has developed a centralised police structure and operation that is less reliant on community relations. Despite this, the population's subjective perception of safety is very good: in 2022 34% of the population felt very safe and 55% fairly safe when walking alone around their home after dark, according to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2022). This stands in contrast to the fact that trust in the Hungarian police is considered to be low in comparison with European Union member states: in 2020 Hungary ranked only 19th among the 27 EU member states in this respect (Müller, 2020). These interconnections point to the need for further research on policing that seeks to deepen the understanding of the relationship between subjective perceptions of safety and policing models.

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