{"created":"2023-05-15T13:51:00.391898+00:00","id":12042,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"0f29d4e7-d161-4b37-b0f6-c79f5693145c"},"_deposit":{"created_by":1,"id":"12042","owners":[1],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"12042"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:chuo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00012042","sets":["255"]},"author_link":["32205","48416","48384","48414","48413","48415"],"item_10002_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2019-05-16","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"314","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"経済研究所 Discussion Paper"},{"bibliographic_title":"IERCU Discussion Paper","bibliographic_titleLang":"en"}]}]},"item_10002_description_19":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_10002_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"This study theoretically and experimentally explores asymmetric volunteers’ dilemma(VOD) games where costs for volunteering is different among players. Diekmann (1993) conjectures that an S-equilibrium, in which a player with less costs contributes, is more likely to be played if it is risk dominant. We re-examined this hypothesis experimentally, as well as via Diekmann's data, to find that even though an S-equilibrium is risk dominant, it does not necessarily hold. Conducting an econometric comparison among models including inequality aversion, level-k, and quantal response equilibrium (QRE), we find that the QRE model fits the data best.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_10002_full_name_24":{"attribute_name":"著者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"48415","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}],"names":[{"name":"川越, 敏司"}]},{"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"48384","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}],"names":[{"name":"松八重, 泰輔"}]},{"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"32205","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}],"names":[{"name":"瀧澤, 弘和"}]},{"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"48416","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}],"names":[{"name":"山森, 哲雄"}]}]},"item_10002_publisher_8":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"中央大学経済研究所"}]},"item_10002_rights_15":{"attribute_name":"権利","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_rights":"この資料の著作権は、資料の著作者または学校法人中央大学に帰属します。著作権法が定める私的利用・引用を超える使用を希望される場合には、掲載誌発行部局へお問い合わせください。"}]},"item_10002_version_type_20":{"attribute_name":"著者版フラグ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85","subitem_version_type":"VoR"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"KAWAGOE, Toshiji","creatorNameLang":"en"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"48413","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"MATSUBAE, Taisuke","creatorNameLang":"en"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"48384","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"TAKIZAWA, Hirokazu","creatorNameLang":"en"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"32205","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"YAMAMORI, Tetsuo","creatorNameLang":"en"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"48414","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2020-04-04"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"DPno314.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"507.2 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"本文を見る","url":"https://chuo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/12042/files/DPno314.pdf"},"version_id":"2bbec1aa-56ff-4ee3-ba5e-961c2d4613d0"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Volunteers’ dilemma","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"risk dominance","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"quantal response equilibrium (QRE)","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"level-k model","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"inequality aversion","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":" experiment JEL classification number: C72, C92, D72, D74, H41","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"departmental bulletin paper","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"Asymmetric Volunteer’s Dilemma Game: Theory and Experiment","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Asymmetric Volunteer’s Dilemma Game: Theory and Experiment","subitem_title_language":"en"}]},"item_type_id":"10002","owner":"1","path":["255"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2020-04-04"},"publish_date":"2020-04-04","publish_status":"0","recid":"12042","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Asymmetric Volunteer’s Dilemma Game: Theory and Experiment"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2023-05-15T17:40:27.785777+00:00"}