@article{oai:chuo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00012056,
 author = {シュテルナート, クリスティアン and 横山, 陸},
 journal = {総合政策研究, Japanese Journal of Policy and Culture},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {application/pdf, In this article, I am dealing with the philosophical problem of death from the viewpoint of phenomenology. I am showing how a phenomenology of death differs from other scientific approaches such as medicine and biology. In contrast to these highly specialized disciplines, a philosophical understanding or even a “phenomenology of death” does not ask what death is but rather what death means to us. The movement of phenomenology has discussed the problem of death extensively for more than hundred years now. In this recurring debate, many of the most prominent figures took a theoretical stand. In this article, I am showing what specifically is at stake when the problem of death is addressed from a phenomenological viewpoint. As a so-called “limit-phenomenon” or even an “a-phenomenal phenomenon,” death poses a certain threat to the very method and operability of phenomenology. This theoretical discussion is accompanied by a very practical concern. How can I deal with my own mortality and the mortality of others? I will argue that our relation to our own mortality is always embedded in intersubjective structures and hence has to be addressed in the context of intersubjectivity.},
 pages = {129--142},
 title = {現象学における死の問題},
 volume = {28},
 year = {2020},
 yomi = {シュテルナート, クリスティアン and ヨコヤマ, リク}
}