@article{oai:chuo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00012589,
 author = {齋藤, 航},
 issue = {4},
 journal = {中央ロー・ジャーナル},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {application/pdf, This section first discusses the two rationales that support the doctrine of comparative negligence: fairness and deterrence. Deterrence means preventing accidents. It reflects the social policy of minimizing damages by encouraging both parties to pay attention. This is quite similar to the rationale of economic efficiency in the doctrine of avoidable consequences. They are both default rules that are applicable in absence of an agreement about a matter in dispute. 
 In this article, the main question is why an injured party should behave reasonably in the absence of contractual obligation. The concept of the default rule for economic efficiency or deterrence would seem to provide an answer. Comparative negligence in Japan should be recognized as the default rule, and an injured party should be required to behave reasonably for economic efficiency. 
 Comparative negligence in Japan can be justified because an injured party who ignores this social requirement should bear some part of damages.},
 pages = {75--109},
 title = {契約違反における過失相殺の法的性質(5･完)},
 volume = {16},
 year = {2020},
 yomi = {サイトウ, コウ}
}