@article{oai:chuo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00016106, author = {OTSUBO, Hironori}, journal = {国際経営学論纂, Journal of Global Management}, month = {Mar}, note = {application/pdf, Predicting initial responses to novel strategic situations has been a challenge in game theory. People are not as sophisticated as players assumed by solution concepts in game theory, and their initial play has a tendency to systematically deviate from equilibrium. Several behavioral models of games have been proposed to bridge a gap between initial behavior and equilibrium play. This paper fits two one-parameter behavioral models, a quantal response equilibrium(QRE) and a cognitive hierarchy(CH) model, into the first-round data of the experiment conducted by Otsubo (2013). Estimation results show that the QRE accounts better for deviations from Nash equilibrium play than the CH model.}, pages = {115--128}, title = {Quantal Response Equilibrium vs. Cognitive Hierarchies : An Analysis of Initial Responses in an Asymmetric All-Pay\nAuction Experiment}, volume = {1}, year = {2022} }