@article{oai:chuo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00016106,
 author = {OTSUBO, Hironori},
 journal = {国際経営学論纂, Journal of Global Management},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {application/pdf, Predicting initial responses to novel strategic situations has been a challenge in game theory. People are not as sophisticated as players assumed by solution concepts in game theory, and their initial play has a tendency to systematically deviate from equilibrium. Several behavioral models of games have been proposed to bridge a gap between initial behavior and equilibrium play. This paper fits two one-parameter behavioral models, a quantal response equilibrium（QRE） and a cognitive hierarchy（CH） model, into the first-round data of the experiment conducted by Otsubo （2013）. Estimation results show that the QRE accounts better for deviations from Nash equilibrium play than the CH model.},
 pages = {115--128},
 title = {Quantal Response Equilibrium vs. Cognitive Hierarchies : An Analysis of Initial Responses in an Asymmetric All-Pay\nAuction Experiment},
 volume = {1},
 year = {2022}
}