@article{oai:chuo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00006503,
 author = {HIRAI, SHUMEI and KAWASHIMA, YASUO and NISHIMURA, NOBUFUMI},
 journal = {経済研究所 Discussion Paper, IERCU Discussion Paper},
 month = {Sep},
 note = {application/pdf, We explore the price squeeze test proposed by the European Commission in a partial and a no relation environments in network industries, which assumes that a new entrant is an equally efficient competitor to the incumbent firm. Under this assumption, the test in a partial regulation environment can show precisely what strategies the incumbent employs in a market, and can also show that differences in costs between the incumbent and the entrant generate either a false negative or a false positive when the one is superior in costs to the other. Moreover, the incumbent in a no regulation environment has no incentives to employ a price squeeze and the test generates a false positive in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. Thus, the test is not a reliable measure to judge strategies of the incumbent if a firm can not enjoy costs advantage. As the Commission decision is based on the test, there is a legal flaw in the procedures for judging true reasons why the entrant exists from a market. It then follows these that the Commission decision fining Deutsche Telekom should be declined.},
 title = {PRICE SQUEEZE AND CASE OF DEUTSCHE TELEKOM:ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE},
 volume = {232},
 year = {2014}
}