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Competition for Territories under the Switching Cost
https://chuo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/16821
https://chuo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/16821b7dcb250-0f38-4446-a493-86632c6f0c56
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
本文を見る (946.7 kB)
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| Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||||
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| 公開日 | 2022-11-16 | |||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||
| タイトル | Competition for Territories under the Switching Cost | |||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | Switching Cost | |||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | Undercut Proof Equilibrium | |||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | LP Gas | |||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | Retail territory | |||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | Auto–Regressive Analysis | |||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | Estimation of Coefficient of the pass– through | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||||
| 著者 |
TORII, Akio
× TORII, Akio
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| 著者別名 | ||||||||
| 識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||||
| 識別子 | 29305 | |||||||
| 姓名 | 鳥居, 昭夫 | |||||||
| 姓名 | トリイ, アキオ | |||||||
| 言語 | ja-Kana | |||||||
| 抄録 | ||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||
| 内容記述 | This article theoretically and empirically considers an effective policy to mitigate market powers held by retail liquefied petroleum gas distributors in Japan. A bilateral spatial competition model is constructed to analyze the effect of the switching cost of consumers on the retail spatial competition. The strategic space in the competition includes the declared free delivery area and the uniform price. Model analysis shows that, if stores commit to the regional designation for free delivery the equilibrium price increases up to the reservation price, and if stores do not commit, there exists an interior equilibrium. At both equilibria stores have their own exclusive delivery areas where rival stores do not intrude. The exclusive areas are natural territories of the stores given endogenously. If the competition is better described by a game where stores commit to their territories, promoting competition with the adjacent market would be effective to mitigate the market power. Whereas, if the competition is described by a game where stores do not commit, policies to lower the switching cost are effective. This paper shows an empirical method to identify which theory best explains the market. The method is applied to the liquefied petroleum gas retail delivery market in Japan. | |||||||
| 書誌情報 |
経済研究所 Discussion Paper en : IERCU Discussion Paper 巻 376, 発行日 2022-11-14 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||||
| 出版者 | 中央大学経済研究所 | |||||||
| 権利 | ||||||||
| 権利情報 | この資料の著作権は、資料の著作者または学校法人中央大学に帰属します。著作権法が定める私的利用・引用を超える使用を希望される場合には、掲載誌発行部局へお問い合わせください。 | |||||||
| フォーマット | ||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||||
| 著者版フラグ | ||||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||
