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Extended Oligopolies with Pollution Penalties and Rewards
https://chuo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/8144
https://chuo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/8144d86d11d7-ea08-4020-aafb-0c5076cee3ab
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||||||||
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公開日 | 2017-04-24 | |||||||||||
タイトル | ||||||||||||
タイトル | Extended Oligopolies with Pollution Penalties and Rewards | |||||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||||
言語 | ||||||||||||
言語 | eng | |||||||||||
キーワード | ||||||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
主題 | Pollution penalties | |||||||||||
キーワード | ||||||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
主題 | Nonpoint source pollution | |||||||||||
キーワード | ||||||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
主題 | Policy lag | |||||||||||
キーワード | ||||||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
主題 | Cournot competition | |||||||||||
資源タイプ | ||||||||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||||||
資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||||||||
著者 |
MATSUMOTO, Akio
× MATSUMOTO, Akio
× SZIDAROVSZKY, Ferenc
× TAKIZAWA, Hirokazu
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著者別名 | ||||||||||||
識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||||||||
識別子 | 27290 | |||||||||||
姓名 | 松本, 昭夫 | |||||||||||
著者別名 | ||||||||||||
識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||||||||
識別子 | 37534 | |||||||||||
姓名 | 瀧澤, 弘和 | |||||||||||
抄録 | ||||||||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||||||
内容記述 | An extended n- rm oligopoly with product differentiation is considered. It is assumed that the government selects an emission standard for the industry and based on the output and technology of each rm it selects a maximum allowed amount of emission for each fi rm. If the actual amount is higher than the allowed maximum, then the rm has to pay a constant multiple of the excess to the government, otherwise it is rewarded similarly based on the saved emission amount. The existence of the unique interior equilibrium is first proved, and then time delay is introduced into the penalties the rms have to pay and into the rewards the rms receive. In analyzing the stability of the equilibrium both continuous and discrete time scales are considered. For mathematical simplicity the case of symmetric rms is analyzed. In the continuous case the equilibrium is either always stable or stable if the delay is sufficiently small and at the critical value Hopf bifurcation occurs. In the discrete case the delay is assumed to be unity. The equilibrium is stable if either the total industry output is sufficiently large or the common speed of adjustment of the firms is sufficiently small. The effect of the level of penalty or reward and that of the emission standard on the industry output and therefore on the total emission level is also examined. |
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書誌情報 |
経済研究所 Discussion Paper en : IERCU Discussion Paper 巻 275, 発行日 2017-03-01 |
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出版者 | ||||||||||||
出版者 | 中央大学経済研究所 | |||||||||||
権利 | ||||||||||||
権利情報 | この資料の著作権は、資料の著作者または学校法人中央大学に帰属します。著作権法が定める私的利用・引用を超える使用を希望される場合には、掲載誌発行部局へお問い合わせください。 | |||||||||||
フォーマット | ||||||||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||||||||
著者版フラグ | ||||||||||||
出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |